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Abstract
In this work we introduce and analyze a new random Tug-of-War game in which one of
the players has the power to decide at each turn whether to play a round of classical random
Tug-of-War, or let the other player choose the new game position in exchange of a fixed payoff.
We prove that this game has a value and identify the partial differential equation to which it
is related, namely
min
{|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0.
This equation is known to have a key role in Jensen’s celebrated proof of uniqueness of infinity
harmonic functions and can also be obtained as a limit of p-Laplace equations. However, this is
the first time that such equation is found to have a relation with game theory. Moreover, our
analysis relies on comparison and viscosity tools, in contrast to probabilistic arguments which
are more common in the literature.
The work also includes a review of the infinity Laplacian and its connection to the classical
random Tug-of-War game, as well as an introduction to the theory of viscosity solutions.
Furthermore, some explicit examples of the new game are considered.
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AMS 2010 Subject Classification: 35J60, 35J70, 91A05, 35D40, 35B51

Contents
Introduction 5
1 Some results on viscosity solutions 9
1.1 Definitions and equivalences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 The concept of jets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 A brief review of the infinity Laplacian 15
2.1 Notion of infinity harmonic function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 On the derivation of the ∞-Laplace operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2 Variational approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.3 An asymptotic mean value formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 The normalized infinity Laplacian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 The classical random Tug-of-War and its connection to the infinity Laplacian 22
3.1 Description of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Players’ strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Value of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 Introducing a new game: the Totalitarian Tug-of-War 27
4.1 Description of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 The Totalitarian Tug-of-War on graphs has a value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.1 A discrete comparison principle on graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the value of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 The -Totalitarian Tug-of-War in Rn has a value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.1 A comparison principle for the DPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3
4.3.2 Existence and uniqueness of the value of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5 Examples of Totalitarian Tug-of-War on graphs 41
5.1 Game on a segment with two running nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1.1 Configuration of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1.2 Game strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1.3 Value of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2 Game on a segment with multiple running nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3 Y-game with two running nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.4 Y-game with multiple running nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6 A PDE for the continuous game value of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War 55
6.1 The limit PDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 Comparison and uniqueness for the limit equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A Second-order elliptic operators 67
Bibliography 69
Introduction
Random Tug-of-War games were introduced in [23] in connection with partial differential
equations (see also the survey [25]). Informally, random Tug-of-War games play for the normalized
infinity Laplacian
∆N∞u =
1
|∇u|2
n∑
i,j=1
uxixjuxiuxj , (1)
the role that the Brownian motion plays for the Laplacian. Observe that (1) is the pure second
derivative of u in the direction of the gradient.
In the classical random Tug-of-War game, two players are in contest and the total earnings of
one player are the losses of the other (it is a two-person, zero-sum game). In the simplest setup,
the game is played by turns on a domain Ω; at each turn a fair coin is tossed and the winner
of the toss is allowed to decide the next game position within a radius  of the current one. If
the game position reaches ∂Ω, the game stops and Player I earns a terminal payoff given by a
function F : ∂Ω→ R (Player II earnings are given by −F ). The terminal payoff F is known to
both players beforehand.
In [23] it was first proved that the random Tug-of-War game has a value, that is, a function
u(x) which represents the expected outcome of the game just described when starting at a point
x and both players play optimally. Moreover, the game value satisfies the following Dynamic
Programming Principle (DPP)
u(x) =
1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)
for all x ∈ Ω.
The key observation in [23] is that the DPP can be seen as a “discretization” of the normalized
infinity Laplacian. In other words, the limit u = lim→0 u, known as the continuous value of
the game, is a viscosity solution of the Dirichlet problem for the normalized infinity Laplacian,
that is, {
−∆N∞u(x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω.
This work is divided in six chapters, which we briefly summarize now. They are mostly
self-contained and our main contributions are in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 as discussed below. Chapter
1 presents some results on viscosity solutions which are necessary for all the analysis in this
work and related literature. We also introduce the concept of jets, needed for the comparison
results considered in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2 is a brief review of the infinity Laplacian, from its definition and notion of infinity
harmonic function to the description of the normalized infinity Laplacian, which is the one that
appears in connection to game theory. Due to the degenerate elliptic nature of these operators,
we include a short appendix describing ellipticity of general second-order partial differential
operators.
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6 Introduction
Game theory, and more precisely random Tug-of-War games, is the topic of Chapter 3. It
includes first a description of random Tug-of-War games in a very general configuration. Then,
the classical random Tug-of-War game is commented in detail, that is, not just the instructions
of the game but the player’s strategies and the concepts of value of the game and Dynamic
Programming Principle (DPP) which we have briefly discussed above. At the end of the chapter
we point out the connection between random Tug-of-War games and the normalized infinity
Laplacian, which occurs via the DPP.
In Chapter 4 we introduce a new game, the Totalitarian Tug-of-War, which is a modified
version of the classical random Tug-of-War game reviewed in Chapter 3. Now, at every turn
Player I has the power to decide whether to play a round of classical random Tug-of-War, or let
Player II choose the new game position in exchange of a fixed payoff of value . The fact that
Player I somehow imposes the type of game that is played, is the reason why we refer to this
game as Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
After a description of the new game, where we point out the differences and similarities with
respect the classical one, we prove that the Totalitarian Tug-of-War has a value when played
either on graphs, or in bounded domains Ω ⊂ Rn. We prove that the game has a value by means
of a comparison principle for the particular DPP associated to each game. In the graph case the
DPP is
ui = max
{
min
j∈{i′}
uj + ,
1
2
(
max
j∈{i′}
uj + min
j∈{i′}
uj
)}
,
where ui stands for the expected value of the game associated to the game position xi, and {i′}
denotes the finite set of indices associated to the nodal neighbors xi′ of xi in the graph. In the
case of a bounded domain Ω ⊂ Rn the DPP is
u(x) = max
{
inf
y∈B(x)
u(y) + ,
1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
, (2)
for all x ∈ Ω. These comparison results are new and, in our opinion, of independent interest.
We also want to remark that these proofs do not use any tools from probability, which is a novel
approach.
Chapter 5 contains several explicit examples of Totalitarian Tug-of-War game on graphs. More
precisely, we consider a game on a graph segment with two running nodes and its generalization
to n running nodes, and the equivalent version for a graph with three terminal nodes on a Y
configuration. The first example, which is the simplest game configuration, describes in detail
how the players decide their strategy and how we end up with a value of the game (recall that
we have proved in the previous chapter the existence and uniqueness of the game value).
Finally, in Chapter 6 we show that there exists a limit u = lim→0 u, known as the continuous
value of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War, and that it can be characterized as the unique solution of
a PDE problem. This is, next to the existence of a value for the game, our main contribution in
this work. It is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem. Let u be the solution of the Dirichlet problem{
G[u](x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ Γ,
where Γ = {x ∈ Rn\Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ }, F : Γ → R is a bounded function and
G[u](x) = min
{
u(x)− inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)− , u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
.
Then, u = lim→0 u uniformly in Ω is the unique viscosity solution to the Dirichlet problem{
min
{|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω.
(3)
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The proof of this result has two parts: the uniform convergence of u to u, solution of (3),
and the uniqueness of this solution. The key point in our proof of convergence is to observe that
the DPP can be seen as a “numerical scheme” which meets the requirements for convergence
stated in the seminal article [3]. The uniqueness of solution u follows via a comparison principle
which was already known in the literature (see [7, 16]). We include the proof of the comparison
principle for the sake of completeness.
We conclude pointing out that the equation in (3) is known to have a key role in Jensen’s
celebrated proof of uniqueness (see [15]) of infinity harmonic functions (i.e., viscosity solutions to
the equation −∆∞u = 0) and can also be obtained as a limit of p-Laplace equations. However,
this is the first time that such equation is found to have a relation with game theory. Moreover,
our analysis relies on comparison and viscosity tools, in contrast to probabilistic arguments
which are more common in the literature.
Furthermore, with small modifications of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game, more precisely,
considering payoffs of value λ instead of , and considering a Totalitarian Tug-of-War which
favors Player II instead of Player I, the results in this work can be extended to treat both
Jensen’s equations
min
{|∇u(x)| − λ,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0 and max{λ− |∇u(x)|,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0. (4)
Even more interestingly, the methods described here could be applied to treat inhomogeneous
versions of (4) with a general right-hand side, and these equations would not be a limit of
p-Laplace equations.
Finally, we would like to mention that the results in this work and the extensions described
above will become a research article in the upcoming months.

Chapter 1
Some results on viscosity
solutions
The theory of viscosity solutions applies to certain second order partial differential equations of
the form G(x, r, p,X) = 0, where G : Rn × R× Rn × Sn → R, for Sn the set of real symmetric
n× n matrices. Some of the primary virtues of this theory are that it allows merely continuous
functions to be solutions of fully nonlinear equations of second order, that it provides very
general existence and uniqueness theorems and that it yields precise formulations of general
boundary conditions (see [7] for a complete analysis of viscosity solutions of second order partial
differential equations). We remark that all our analysis relies on partial differential equations
and viscosity arguments, in contrast to probabilistic arguments that are more usual in the
literature.
Moreover, we require G to satisfy the following degenerate ellipticity condition (we say that
G is degenerate elliptic),
G(x, r, p,X) ≤ G(x, r, p, Y ) whenever Y ≤ X, (1.1)
where Sn is equipped with the usual order in the space of matrices. We remark that the sign
convention we use in (1.1) corresponds to G = −∆. Another monotonicity condition that is
often (but not always) required is the following,
G(x, r, p,X) ≤ G(x, s, p,X) whenever r ≤ s. (1.2)
Conditions (1.1) and (1.2) can be formulated together as
G(x, r, p,X) ≤ G(x, s, p, Y ) whenever r ≤ s and Y ≤ X. (1.3)
When (1.3) holds, G is said to be proper in the terminology of [7], where more details on the
notations and definitions below can be found.
1.1 Definitions and equivalences
The type of functions defined next is the one required for the viscosity solutions. Moreover,
from now on we will consider Ω ⊂ Rn open.
Definition 1.1 (Semicontinuous function). A function u : Ω→ R ∪ {−∞} is upper semicon-
tinuous if the set {x ∈ Ω : u(x) < λ} is open for every λ ∈ R, or equivalently, if
lim sup
y→x
u(y) ≤ u(x) for all x ∈ Ω.
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Similarly, a function u : Ω→ R ∪ {+∞} is lower semicontinuous if the set {x ∈ Ω : u(x) > λ}
is open for every λ ∈ R, or equivalently, if
lim inf
y→x u(y) ≥ u(x) for all x ∈ Ω.
Alternatively, a function u is lower semicontinuous if −u is upper semicontinuous and vice
versa.
Remark 1.2. The continuity of a function is equivalent to being both upper and lower semicon-
tinuous.
Definition 1.3 (Viscosity solution). A viscosity subsolution of the equation G = 0 (equivalently
a viscosity solution of G ≤ 0) in Ω is an upper semicontinuous function u : Ω→ R such that
G
(
xˆ, ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ≤ 0, (1.4)
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and u(x) ≤ ϕ(x), for all x in a
neighborhood of xˆ (in other words, ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ, or
equivalently, u− ϕ has a local maximum at xˆ).
Similarly, a viscosity supersolution of G = 0 (equivalently a viscosity solution of G ≥ 0) in
Ω is a lower semicontinuous function u : Ω→ R such that
G
(
xˆ, ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ≥ 0,
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and u(x) ≥ ϕ(x), for all x in a
neighborhood of xˆ (in other words, ϕ touches u at xˆ from below in a neighborhood of xˆ, or
equivalently, u− ϕ has a local minimum at xˆ).
Finally, a function u : Ω→ R is a viscosity solution of G = 0 in Ω if it is both a viscosity
subsolution and viscosity supersolution of G = 0 in Ω.
According to Definition 1.3, we require that the so-called test functions ϕ touch the viscosity
subsolutions from above and viscosity supersolutions from below. This motivates to ask for
upper semicontinuity in the case of viscosity subsolutions and lower semicontinuity for viscosity
supersolutions.
Remark 1.4. In some situations it is necessary that the test function ϕ touches u at xˆ strictly
from above in a neighborhood of xˆ (or equivalently, u− ϕ has a strict local maximum at xˆ) for
the case of viscosity subsolutions, and analogously that ϕ touches u at xˆ strictly from below in
a neighborhood of xˆ (or equivalently, u − ϕ has a strict local minimum at xˆ) for the case of
viscosity supersolutions.
Note that this is an equivalent definition of viscosity sub- and supersolutions. On the one
hand, it is clear that the new definition implies the original one since it is more restrictive
(inequalities in Definition 1.3 are replaced by strict inequalities). On the other hand, the new
definition can be derived from Definition 1.3 as follows. For the case of viscosity subsolutions, it
is enough to consider ϕ˜(x) = ϕ(x) + |x− xˆ|4 as test function. Due to this particular choice of
ϕ˜ ∈ C2(Ω), ϕ˜ touches u at xˆ ∈ Ω strictly from above in a neighborhood of xˆ (or equivalently,
u− ϕ˜ has a strict local maximum at xˆ) and
G
(
xˆ, ϕ˜(xˆ),∇ϕ˜(xˆ), D2ϕ˜(xˆ)) = G (xˆ, ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ≤ 0
is satisfied, in view of (1.4). The case of viscosity supersolutions follows analogously taking
ϕ˜(x) = ϕ(x)− |x− xˆ|4. Just to mention that, abusing of notation, the new test functions are
also denoted as ϕ(x).
With the following result we show that the notion of viscosity solution is consistent with the
notion of classical solution, under the assumption of enough regularity on the solution.
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Proposition 1.5 (Consistency of the definition). Let u ∈ C2(Ω). Then u is a classical solution
of G = 0 in Ω, that is,
G(x, u(x),∇u(x), D2u(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ Ω, (1.5)
if and only if u is a viscosity solution to G = 0 in Ω.
Proof. Consider first that u is a classical solution of G = 0 in Ω. Let xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such
that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ, then by calculus ∇u(xˆ) = ∇ϕ(xˆ) and
D2u(xˆ) ≤ D2ϕ(xˆ). By degenerate ellipticity of G, i.e., assuming that (1.1) holds, it follows that
G(xˆ, ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ≤ G(xˆ, u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)) = 0, (1.6)
which shows that u is a viscosity subsolution to G = 0 in Ω, according to Definition 1.3. By
a similar argument, one can prove that u is also a viscosity supersolution to G = 0 in Ω and
therefore a viscosity solution.
Conversely, if u ∈ C2(Ω) is a viscosity solution of G = 0 in Ω, u itself works as test function
ϕ in Definition 1.3. It then follows that (1.5) holds and therefore u is a solution in the classical
sense to G = 0 in Ω.
1.2 The concept of jets
Assume, for instance, that ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) touches u at xˆ ∈ Ω from above in a neighborhood of xˆ. In
other words, xˆ is a local maximum of u− ϕ, so that
u(xˆ)− ϕ(xˆ) ≥ u(x)− ϕ(x)
for all x in a neighborhood of xˆ. Rearranging the terms as u(x) ≤ u(xˆ)−ϕ(xˆ) +ϕ(x) and doing
a Taylor expansion of ϕ around xˆ at x, we get
u(x) ≤ u(xˆ) + 〈p, (x− xˆ)〉+ 1
2
〈X (x− xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉+ o (|x− xˆ|2) as x→ xˆ, (1.7)
where p = ∇ϕ(xˆ) and X = D2ϕ(xˆ). Moreover, if (1.7) holds for some (p,X) ∈ Rn × Sn and
u is twice differentiable at xˆ, then p = ∇u(xˆ) = ∇ϕ(xˆ) and D2u(xˆ) ≤ X = D2ϕ(xˆ) since ϕ
touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ. Thus, if u is a classical solution of G ≤ 0, it
follows from (1.1) that G(xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) ≤ 0 whenever (1.7) holds. Note that the same discussion
can be analogously reproduced for G ≥ 0, where ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) touches u at xˆ from below in a
neighborhood of xˆ.
In case u is not regular enough, the following concepts appear necessary for the definition of
non-differentiable solutions u to the equation G = 0.
Definition 1.6 (Subjet/Superjet). Given a function u : Ω → R, the (second-order) superjet
J2,+Ω u(xˆ) at the point xˆ ∈ Ω is defined to be the set of points
J2,+Ω u(xˆ) =
{
(p,X) ∈ Rn × Sn : u(x) ≤ u(xˆ) + 〈p, (x− xˆ)〉+ 1
2
〈X (x− xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉
+ o
(|x− xˆ|2) , as x→ xˆ}. (1.8)
Similarly, the (second-order) subjet J2,−Ω u(xˆ) at the point xˆ ∈ Ω is defined as
J2,−Ω u(xˆ) =
{
(p,X) ∈ Rn × Sn : u(x) ≥ u(xˆ) + 〈p, (x− xˆ)〉+ 1
2
〈X (x− xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉
+ o
(|x− xˆ|2) , as x→ xˆ}. (1.9)
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If u is twice differentiable at xˆ ∈ Ω, then p = ∇u(xˆ) and X = D2u(xˆ) belong to both sets of
pairs (p,X) in (1.8) and (1.9). Note also that the subjets can be equivalently defined in terms
of superjets as J2,−Ω u(xˆ) = −J2,+Ω (−u)(xˆ). Furthermore, we can consider their closure, which
follows now.
Definition 1.7 (Closure of subjet/superjet). The closures of J2,+Ω u(xˆ) and J
2,−
Ω u(xˆ) at the
point xˆ ∈ Ω, are respectively defined as the sets
J
2,+
Ω u(xˆ) =
{
(p,X) ∈ Rn × Sn : ∃ (xn, pn, Xn) ∈ Ω× Rn × Sn such that
(pn, Xn) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xn) and (xn, u(xn), pn, Xn)→ (xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) , as n→∞
}
and
J
2,−
Ω u(xˆ) =
{
(p,X) ∈ Rn × Sn : ∃ (xn, pn, Xn) ∈ Ω× Rn × Sn such that
(pn, Xn) ∈ J2,−Ω u(xn) and (xn, u(xn), pn, Xn)→ (xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) , as n→∞
}
.
Just to mention that since J2,+Ω u(xˆ) is the same for all sets Ω for which xˆ is an interior point,
it is usual to write all these sets as J2,+u(xˆ). The same convention applies to subjets, J2,−u(xˆ),
and their respective closure, J
2,+
u(xˆ) and J
2,−
u(xˆ).
The following lemma gives an equivalent definition to Definition 1.3 for viscosity solutions in
terms of jets.
Lemma 1.8. A function u : Ω→ R is a viscosity subsolution of G = 0 in Ω if and only if u is
upper semicontinuous and
G(xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) ≤ 0 for all xˆ ∈ Ω and all (p,X) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xˆ). (1.10)
Similarly, a function u : Ω → R is a viscosity supersolution of G = 0 in Ω if and only if u is
lower semicontinuous and
G(xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) ≥ 0 for all xˆ ∈ Ω and all (p,X) ∈ J2,−Ω u(xˆ).
Proof. Assume first that u is a viscosity subsolution of G = 0 in the sense of Definition 1.3 and
let (p,X) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xˆ). We want to show (1.10). Define
ϕ(x) = u(xˆ) + 〈p, (x− xˆ)〉+ 1
2
〈X (x− xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉 ,
so that ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) satisfies u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and, according to (1.8), u(x) ≤ ϕ(x) for all x in some
neighborhood of xˆ. Then, G(xˆ, ϕ(xˆ), p,X) ≤ 0 by Definition 1.3, so we end up with
G (xˆ, u(xˆ), p,X) = G (xˆ, ϕ(xˆ), p,X) ≤ 0
for all xˆ ∈ Ω and all (p,X) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xˆ).
Consider now the reverse implication. We assume that u satisfies (1.10) and seek to prove
that given xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ,
(1.4) holds. In fact, from the Taylor expansion up to second order terms of ϕ around xˆ at x, we
get
u(x) ≤ ϕ(x) = ϕ(xˆ) + 〈∇ϕ(xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉+ 1
2
〈
D2ϕ(xˆ) (x− xˆ), (x− xˆ)〉+ o (|x− xˆ|2) as x→ xˆ
and therefore
(∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xˆ), according to (1.8). This implies that
G(xˆ, ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) = G(xˆ, u(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)) ≤ 0,
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ.
The proof for the case of viscosity supersolution follows analogously.
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We would like to stress that according to Lemma 1.8, it follows that for every pair (p,X) ∈
J2,+Ω u(xˆ) there exists ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ
and (p,X) =
(∇ϕ(xˆ), D2ϕ(xˆ)). The analogous result holds for every pair (p,X) ∈ J2,−Ω u(xˆ).

Chapter 2
A brief review of the infinity
Laplacian
Informally, the infinity Laplacian ∆∞u is the second derivative of u in the direction of its
gradient, properly normalized (see Section 2.2). More precisely, we have the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (Infinity Laplacian). For a smooth function u = u(x1, x2, . . . , xn) : Ω → R,
Ω ⊂ Rn open, the infinity Laplacian (also known as the ∞-Laplace operator) is the fully
nonlinear second-order degenerate partial differential operator denoted by ∆∞ and given by
∆∞u :=
〈
D2u∇u,∇u〉 = n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
. (2.1)
The operator appears naturally when one considers absolutely minimizing Lipschitz extensions
of a given Lipschitz boundary function (see [25, Section 3] for instance). Moreover, solutions
to the ∞-Laplace equation, −∆∞u = 0, are used in several applications, such as optimal
transportation and image processing (see, e.g., [10, 13]). The eigenvalue problem for the infinity
Laplacian has been exhaustively studied too (see [16, Section 6]) and is formulated as
min
{
|∇u(x)| − 1
d
u(x),−∆N∞u(x)
}
= 0 for x ∈ Ω,
where d = ‖dist(x, ∂Ω)‖∞,Ω. Note also that the∞-Laplace equation can be given a probabilistic
interpretation in terms of game theory (see, e.g., [23, 25]), which is precisely the approach that
we will follow.
Now, in order to motivate the elliptic nature of the ∞-Laplace operator, we present a short
review on elliptic operators (some extra comments are included in Appendix A). A deep look
into second-order elliptic equations can be found in [9, Chapter 6].
Thus, ellipticity for a second-order partial differential operator G (see Definition A.2, ac-
cording to [9, Section 6.1.1]) means that for each point x ∈ Ω, the symmetric coefficient matrix
A(x) = (ai,j(x))i,j is positive definite, with smallest eigenvalue greater than or equal to λ.
For the particular case ai,j ≡ δi,j and bi ≡ c ≡ 0, the operator G is −∆, that is, minus the
Laplace operator, which is clearly elliptic. The infinity Laplacian corresponds to the choice
ai,j ≡ ∂u∂xi ∂u∂xj and bi ≡ c ≡ 0 according to (2.1), so that (see [28, Section 1.5])
n∑
i,j=1
ai,j(x) ξi ξj =
n∑
i,j=1
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
ξi ξj =
 n∑
i,j=1
∂u
∂xi
ξi
2 ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the matrix A associated to −∆∞ is not positive definite but positive semidefinite.
The reason is that −∆∞ is not an elliptic but degenerate elliptic operator, as it is described
now.
According to (1.1), −∆∞u = −〈X p, p〉 is degenerate elliptic if
− 〈X p, p〉 ≤ − 〈Y p, p〉 whenever Y ≤ X, (2.2)
for p ∈ Rn and X,Y ∈ Sn. This is the case, since Y ≤ X means that X − Y is a positive
semidefinite matrix, i.e., 〈(X − Y ) ξ, ξ〉 ≥ 0 for all ξ ∈ Rn, which by bilinearity of the scalar
product can be equivalently written as −〈X ξ, ξ〉 ≤ − 〈Y ξ, ξ〉. Therefore, condition (2.2) holds.
2.1 Notion of infinity harmonic function
The framework of viscosity solutions (see Chapter 1) turns out to be the natural one for the
definition and study of the ∞-Laplace operator. The reason is not only the (possible) lack of
regularity of the function u, but the fact that −∆∞ is not in divergence form (see (A.1)), so we
cannot integrate by parts to define a notion of weak solution.
The reason why one does not restrict the study only to C2 solutions is that in the Dirichlet
problem for the equation −∆∞u = 0, one can prescribe smooth boundary values that no C2
solution can attain. This is formalized in the following theorem, which was proved for the
two-dimensional case by Aronsson in [1]. The case for dimension n ≥ 3 is included in [29].
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that u ∈ C2(Ω) and that −∆∞u = 0 in Ω. Then, either ∇u 6= 0 in Ω
or u reduces to a constant.
As a remedy to the previous discussion there arise the following notion of solution, which is
suitable when u is not regular enough. It is just Definition 1.3 for the particular case of the
∞-Laplace equation (these and other related results can be found in [27, Section 4] and [28,
Section 2.1]).
Definition 2.3 (Viscosity solution of the ∞-Laplace equation). A viscosity subsolution of
−∆∞u = 0 (equivalently a viscosity solution of −∆∞u ≤ 0) in Ω is an upper semicontinuous
function u : Ω→ R such that
−∆∞ϕ(xˆ) ≤ 0,
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ.
A viscosity supersolution of −∆∞u = 0 (equivalently a viscosity solution of −∆∞u ≥ 0) in
Ω is a lower semicontinuous function u : Ω→ R such that
−∆∞ϕ(xˆ) ≥ 0,
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at xˆ from below in a neighborhood of xˆ.
A function u : Ω → R is a viscosity solution of −∆∞u = 0 in Ω if it is both a viscosity
subsolution and viscosity supersolution of −∆∞u = 0 in Ω.
Definition 2.4 (Infinity harmonic function). An infinity harmonic function in Ω is a viscosity
solution of −∆∞u = 0 in Ω.
We remark that the previous definitions are also satisfied when the solution is of class C2, as
it is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 (Consistency of the definition). If u ∈ C2(Ω), then u is infinity harmonic in
Ω if and only if −∆∞u = 0 in Ω in the classical pointwise sense.
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Proof. Suppose that u is infinity harmonic in Ω. Since u ∈ C2(Ω), the function itself works as a
test function in Definition 2.3, so that −∆∞u = 0 in Ω in the pointwise sense.
Reciprocally, assume that u ∈ C2(Ω) satisfies −∆∞u = 0 in Ω in the pointwise sense. In
particular, −∆∞u ≤ 0 in Ω in the pointwise sense. Then, whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such
that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ, it follows that
∇ϕ(xˆ) = ∇u(xˆ) and D2ϕ(xˆ) ≥ D2u(xˆ).
Using this, we have that
−∆∞ϕ(xˆ) = −
〈
D2ϕ(xˆ)∇ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ)〉 = − 〈D2ϕ(xˆ)∇u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ)〉
≤ − 〈D2u(xˆ)∇u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ)〉 = −∆∞u(xˆ) ≤ 0.
Similarly, since −∆∞u = 0 holds in Ω in the pointwise sense for u ∈ C2(Ω), in particular
−∆∞u ≥ 0 in Ω in the pointwise sense. Then, whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ
touches u at xˆ from below in a neighborhood of xˆ, it follows that
∇ϕ(xˆ) = ∇u(xˆ) and D2ϕ(xˆ) ≤ D2u(xˆ).
Thus, one gets that
−∆∞ϕ(xˆ) = −
〈
D2ϕ(xˆ)∇ϕ(xˆ),∇ϕ(xˆ)〉 = − 〈D2ϕ(xˆ)∇u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ)〉
≥ − 〈D2u(xˆ)∇u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ)〉 = −∆∞u(xˆ) ≥ 0.
Hence, in view of Definition 2.3, u is infinity harmonic in Ω.
By Proposition 2.5, a classical solution of −∆∞u = 0 is a viscosity solution. However, the
converse might not be true, as it is the case of the function
u(x, y) = x4/3 − y4/3,
which is not an infinity harmonic function in the classical sense but in the viscosity sense. In
fact, this particular u has regularity C1,1/3, but its second derivatives do not exist on the lines
x = 0 and y = 0 (see [6] for more details).
All this leads us to focus now on the regularity of the infinity Laplacian, which turns out
to be a very tough question (see comments on [8, Section 3], [27, Section 6], [28, Section 1.5
and 1.8]). According to [12], infinity harmonic functions are differentiable everywhere, while
it remains an open problem to prove the C1 or C1,α regularity in general dimensions, they are
known to hold only in two dimensions after the breakthroughs of [11] and [26].
Related to the previous discussion, the following theorem is a regularity result for infinity
harmonic functions, the proof of which can be found in [27, Theorem 7].
Theorem 2.6. If u : Ω→ R is an infinity harmonic function in Ω, then it is locally Lipschitz
continuous in Ω.
Remark 2.7. By Rademacher’s theorem (see below), infinity harmonic functions are differen-
tiable almost everywhere in its domain.
Theorem 2.8 (Rademacher). A Lipschitz continuous function u is differentiable almost every-
where in its domain, i.e., the expansion
u(y) = u(x) + 〈∇u(x), (y − x)〉+ o (|y − x|) as y → x
holds at almost every point x of the domain.
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2.1.1 On the derivation of the ∞-Laplace operator
As the nomenclature “infinity Laplacian” suggests, the ∞-Laplace equation, −∆∞u = 0, is
proved to be the limit as p→∞ in the p-Laplace equation, −∆pu = 0. More details on this fact
appear in Section 2.1.2, however a detailed and rigorous proof can be found in [5].
In order to get some intuition on this derivation of the infinity Laplacian, consider the
expansion of the p-Laplacian operator under the assumption that u is regular enough,
∆pu = ∇ ·
(|∇u|p−2∇u)
= |∇u|p−2 ∆u+ (p− 2) |∇u|p−4
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
= (p− 2) |∇u|p−4
 |∇u|2
p− 2 ∆u+
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
 .
By assuming that u is p-harmonic, i.e., −∆pu = 0, and that |∇u| 6= 0 (so that we can divide by
(p− 2) |∇u|p−4), it follows from the previous expansion that
|∇u|2
p− 2 ∆u+
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
= 0.
Assuming uniform convergence and taking the limit p→∞ we obtain
∆∞u =
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂u
∂xi
∂u
∂xj
= 0.
We remark that this is not a rigorous derivation (see [5]), which has to be done in the
framework of viscosity solutions for the case when functions are not regular enough.
2.1.2 Variational approach
In Section 2.1.1 it is shown heuristically that the infinity Laplacian is limit as p → ∞ of the
p-Laplacian. Our aim now is to analyze this fact in more detail in the variational framework.
Note first that since we are only looking at very large values of p (recall that we want to
take p→∞), one can assume p > n, for n the dimension of Rn. Under this consideration and
provided ∂Ω is C1, for Ω ⊂ Rn a bounded domain, the Sobolev space W 1,p(Ω) contains only
continuous functions and the boundary values are taken in the classical sense, due to Morrey’s
inequality (this and other results on Sobolev spaces and functional analysis can be found in [9]).
Let us start then with the statement of the following variational result on the p-Laplace
equation (see [18, Theorem 2.4] for a proof).
Theorem 2.9. Given n < p <∞, a bounded domain Ω and F ∈ C(Ω) ∩W 1,p(Ω), there exists
a unique solution to the minimizing problem
up(x) = min
v
{ˆ
Ω
|∇v(x)|p dx : v ∈ C(Ω) ∩ W 1,p(Ω) and v|∂Ω = F
}
. (2.3)
The minimizer is also a weak solution of −∆pu = −∇ ·
(|∇u|p−2∇u) = 0 in Ω, i.e.,ˆ
Ω
〈|∇u|p−2∇u,∇η〉 dx = 0 for all η ∈ C∞c (Ω). (2.4)
Conversely, a weak solution to (2.4) in C(Ω) ∩ W 1,p(Ω) is always a minimizer up (among
functions with its own boundary values).
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Consider now u∞ = limp→∞ up uniformly in Ω, for up a weak solution to the p-Laplace
equation. According to this, the following definition holds when u∞ solves the ∞-Laplace
equation in the viscosity sense, which is the limit equation of the p-Laplace equation as p→∞,
in view of Section 2.1.1.
Definition 2.10 (Variational solution). A variational solution of the ∞-Laplace equation is the
uniform limit of weak solutions to the p-Laplace equation via a suitable subsequence (pk)k for
pk →∞, i.e.,
u∞ = lim
pk→∞
upk .
Furthermore, the limit function u∞ is Lipschitz continuous in Ω and since
lim
p→∞
(ˆ
D
|∇u(x)|p dx
) 1
p
= ess supx∈D|∇u(x)| = ‖∇u‖L∞(D)
for D ⊂ Ω a subdomain, one might guess in view of (2.3) that it minimizes somehow ‖∇u‖L∞(D).
This is so according to the following theorem, which asserts the existence of variational solution
under certain conditions. Note that the space W 1,∞(Ω) appearing in the statement of the
theorem, consists of all Lipschitz continuous functions defined in Ω, provided ∂Ω is C1 (see [9,
Section 5.8.2.b]).
Theorem 2.11 (Theorem 3.2 in [18]). Given F ∈ C(Ω) ∩W 1,∞(Ω), there exists a function
u∞ ∈ C(Ω) ∩W 1,∞(Ω) with boundary values u∞ = F on ∂Ω having the following minimizing
property in each subdomain D ⊂ Ω: if v ∈ C(D) ∩W 1,∞(D) and v = u∞ on ∂Ω, then
‖∇u∞‖L∞(D) ≤ ‖∇v‖L∞(D).
This u∞ can be obtained as the uniform limit in Ω of upk , where upk denotes the weak solution
of the pk-Laplace equation such that upk = F on ∂Ω.
Remark 2.12. Weak solutions up of (2.4) are viscosity solutions of −∆pu = 0 in Ω, by [18,
Theorem 2.4], and variational solutions u∞ of the ∞-Laplace equation are viscosity solutions to
−∆∞u = 0 in Ω, according to [18, Theorem 4.6]. Because of this, every variational solution
u∞ is an infinity harmonic function. The importance of being viscosity solution is due to the
fact that the framework of viscosity solutions is the natural one for the type of equations we are
dealing with, as we mentioned before.
The inhomogeneous equation −∆∞u = f
In some problems the limit equation of which the limit function u∞ is solution, is not the
expected one, as it is the case of the so-called ∞-Poisson equation,
−∆∞u(x) = f(x). (2.5)
It has to be observed that, in general (2.5) is not the limit as p → ∞ of the corresponding
p-Poisson equation −∆pu = f . For instance, let up be the weak solution to the Dirichlet problem{
−∆pu(x) = 1, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = 0, x ∈ ∂Ω, (2.6)
which is also a viscosity solution, as it occurred with the weak solutions of the p-Laplace equation
(see Remark 2.12 and [18, Theorem 2.4]).
The results in [5, 17] show that u∞ = limp→∞ up is the distance function, i.e., u∞ =
dist(x, ∂Ω) for x ∈ Ω. In fact, according to [16, Lemma 6.10], the distance function u∞ is the
unique viscosity solution to the Dirichlet problem{
min {|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆∞u(x)} = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = 0, x ∈ ∂Ω, (2.7)
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which turns out to be the limit problem of (2.6) as p→∞ (all the details can be found in [5]).
Thus, it is not true that −∆∞u(x) = 1 is the limit equation as p→∞ of (2.6), as one might
expect, and therefore there is no variational solution of the ∞-Poisson equation −∆∞u(x) = 1.
Remark 2.13. We want to stress that (2.7) has a probabilistic interpretation in terms of certain
random Tug-of-War games, which is a new result and our main contribution in this work.
More results on the Dirichlet problem for the ∞-Poisson equation with boundary values not
necessarily null, are considered in [18, Chapter 10]. Some of these results are the existence of
solution to the Dirichlet problem, which is proved via the celebrated Perron’s method, and a
comparison principle for viscosity solutions of the ∞-Poisson equation.
2.1.3 An asymptotic mean value formula
It was discovered in [19] that p-harmonic functions satisfy the following nonlinear mean value
formula
u(x) =
(
p− 2
p+ n
)
maxB(x) u+ minB(x) u
2
+
(
2 + n
p+ n
) 
B(x)
u(y) dy + o(2) as → 0. (2.8)
Moreover, it has a game-theoretic interpretation, where it is essential that the coefficients add
up to 1, so that they play the role of conditional probabilities.
Note that the second term of (2.8) is linear, while the first one is nonlinear (the greater the p,
the more weight in the formula and stronger nonlinearity). In particular, the case p = 2 reduces
to
u(x) =
 
B(x)
u(y) dy for all x ∈ Ω, (2.9)
which is the well-known mean value property that characterizes harmonic functions. The
following theorem (see [14, Theorem 2.7] for a proof and more details on this topic) formalizes
this fact.
Theorem 2.14. A function u is harmonic in Ω if and only if u ∈ C(Ω) and for every ball
compactly embedded in Ω, it satisfies the mean value property (2.9).
On the other hand, when p→∞ one gets the asymptotic formula, fundamental in image
processing and for some numerical algorithms (see, e.g., [22]),
u(x) =
1
2
(
max
B(x)
u+ min
B(x)
u
)
+ o(2) as → 0. (2.10)
It provides an alternative definition to infinity harmonic functions through the following result,
a proof of which can be found in [18, Theorem 5.3] and also appears later as part of the proof of
Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 2.15. A function u is a viscosity solution to the ∞-Laplace equation in Ω, i.e., is
infinity harmonic in Ω, if and only if u ∈ C(Ω) and the mean value formula (2.10) holds in Ω in
the viscosity sense.
2.2 The normalized infinity Laplacian
The normalized version of the infinity Laplacian (see (2.1)) is the one that appears in the
framework of game theory and is defined as (according to [25, Section 3.4])
∆N∞u(x) :=

〈
D2u(x) ∇u(x)|∇u(x)| ,
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
〉
= |∇u(x)|−2 ∆∞u(x), if ∇u(x) 6= 0;
limy→x
2(u(y)−u(x))
|y−x|2 , otherwise.
(2.11)
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Note that when ∇u(x) 6= 0, the normalized∞-Laplacian coincides with the Laplace operator,
∆u, in the segment case. Moreover, the homogeneous equation −∆N∞u = 0 is equivalent to the
∞-Laplace equation.
About the expression of ∆N∞u(x) in (2.11) when ∇u(x) = 0, it follows from the Taylor
expansion of u(y) at x up to second order terms in the case when u ∈ C2, that is,
u(y) = u(x) + 〈∇u(x), (y − x)〉+ 1
2
〈
D2u(x) (y − x), (y − x)〉+ o (|y − x|2)
= u(x) +
1
2
〈
D2u(x) (y − x), (y − x)〉+ o (|y − x|2) as y → x.
Rearranging terms in the last expression and dividing by |y − x|2, we get
2(u(y)− u(x))
|y − x|2 =
〈
D2u(x)
y − x
|y − x| ,
y − x
|y − x|
〉
+ o(1) as y → x.
Consider now the second derivative of u in the direction v, i.e.,
D2vu(x) =
d2
dξ2
∣∣∣∣
ξ=0
u(x+ ξv) =
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
(x) vi vj .
In view of (2.11), at the points where ∇u(x) 6= 0 we can take v = ∇u(x)|∇u(x)| , so that ∆N∞u is the
second derivative of u in the direction of its gradient. On the other hand, at the points where
∇u(x) = 0 it is said that D2u(x) is the same in every direction (no direction is preferred), that
is, the limit of u(y)−u(x)|y−x|2 exists as y → x.
Chapter 3
The classical random Tug-of-War
and its connection to the infinity
Laplacian
3.1 Description of the game
A random Tug-of-War game is a two-person zero-sum random-turn game, that is, two players
are in a contest which involves some randomness for the turn choice, and the total earnings of
one player are the losses of the other. Hence, one of them, say Player I, plays trying to maximize
his or her expected outcome, while the other, say Player II, is trying to minimize Player I’s
outcome (or in other words, since the game is zero-sum, maximize his or her own outcome).
The configuration of such games can be described in terms of some parameters. These are
a set X of states of the game, a non-empty set Y ⊂ X of terminal states, a terminal payoff
function F : Y → R and a running payoff function f : X\Y → R. Moreover, consider EI and
EII the graphs with vertex set X, which describe the possible move options for Players I and II,
respectively, at any game state. In the case of the random Tug-of-War, E := EI = EII , i.e.,
players have identical move options and E is undirected, i.e., all moves are reversible.
In the classical random Tug-of-War, the game starts with a token placed at position x0 ∈ X\Y .
A fair coin is tossed and the player who wins the toss chooses a new position for the token
among all positions adjacent to the current one (x0 in the first turn), according to the graph E.
Moreover, both players are assumed to play optimally, that is, they choose the position which is
most favorable to increase the final payoff they receive.
This procedure is repeated at each turn until the token reaches for the first time any xk ∈ Y .
Then the game ends and Player I receives the total payoff F (xk) +
∑k−1
i=0 f(x
i) from Player II.
This is so since F (xk) is the payoff associated to the terminal position of the game, xk, and
f(xi), for i = 0, . . . , k − 1, refers to the payoff associated at each running node (game position)
where the token has been placed along the game. In other words, the running payoff f(xi)
represents the reward for Player I (the cost for Player II) at each intermediate state xi of the
game.
Remark 3.1. The previous description follows [23], where all results are presented in general
length spaces. Now the classical random Tug-of-War game, which has just been described in a
general metric space, is formulated in a bounded domain Ω ⊂ Rn, as it is done in [25].
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Let Ω ⊂ Rn a bounded domain and  > 0 fixed, so that
Γ = {x ∈ Rn\Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ } (3.1)
denotes a compact boundary strip of width , and F : Γ → R and f : Ω→ R two continuous
functions. At an initial time, a token is placed at a point x0 ∈ Ω. Then, a fair coin is tossed and
the winner of the toss is allowed to move the token to any x1 ∈ B(x0), and another turn starts.
The two players proceed in this way at each turn until the token reaches some xk ∈ Γ. This
implies the end of the game and a payoff of value F (xk) +
∑k−1
i=0 f(x
i), which Player I receives
from Player II. Alternatively, we can say that Player II receives a payoff −F (xk)−∑k−1i=0 f(xi)
from Player I.
Note that the reason for using the boundary strip Γ instead of simply using the boundary
∂Ω of our domain, is the fact that, for x ∈ Ω, the ball B(x) is not necessarily contained in Ω
but in Ω ∪ Γ. However, it is also possible to define the game using B(x) ∩ Ω instead of Γ. In
this case, the game token (in the game position xi, for i = 0, . . . , k − 1) can be moved to any
xi+1 ∈ B(xi) ∩ Ω, and the game ends when the token reaches some xk ∈ ∂Ω.
3.2 Players’ strategies
A pure strategy Sα = {Skα}k for player α is a sequence of mappings from histories Hk to actions
ak. The history up to stage k is the sequence of game positions and actions up to the kth turn
of the game, written as Hk = (x0, a0, x1, a1, . . . , ak−1, xk), where xi for i = 0, . . . , k stands for
the game position at the ith turn and ai means the action carried out by the player who moved
in this turn from position xi.
Roughly speaking, at every turn the strategy indicates the player’s next move, provided
such player is given the choice, as a function of the current game position and past history. In
other words, the strategy of a player says what action to take at each running node of the game,
but it depends on the evolution of the game that these actions are accomplished or not. More
information about the general notion of strategy can be found in [25, Section 3.1].
For some games, the action of a player at a given node is independent of both the stage of
the game where the decision is made and the history up to that stage. In particular, for these
games (the classical random Tug-of-War and the game presented in Chapter 4 are examples),
strategies will be independent of time and initial position.
3.3 Value of the game
For a game where Players I and II adopt strategies SI and SII respectively and start the game
at position xi (this is not the same as x
i, which was the position at the ith turn), the expected
payoff Player I receives from Player II is defined as
V xiSI ,SII (I) :=
{
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ ], if the game ends almost surely;
−∞, otherwise, (3.2)
where ExiSI ,SII [Fτ ] is the expected payoff that Player I receives from Player II when they follow
strategies SI and SII respectively and the game starts at the node xi. Fτ is the payoff associated
to the terminal node xτ . On the contrary, there might exist games for which the players can
choose strategies so that the game does not end almost surely. In order to penalize these
strategies, the expected payoff that each player receives from the other is the worst possible,
that is, −∞ in the case of Player I and +∞ for Player II.
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Analogously, the expected payoff that Player II has to pay Player I is defined as
V xiSI ,SII (II) :=
{
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ ], if the game ends almost surely;
+∞, otherwise. (3.3)
Note that V xiSI ,SII (I), V
xi
SI ,SII
(II) defined above represent the expected payoff that players
receive from each other when a game, played using a pair of strategies SI , SII , ends almost
surely. These can be used to assign a value to the game as follows. Consider first the least
payoff which Player I expects to receive from Player II when Player I’s strategy is subordinated
to Player II’s strategy. It is called the value of the game for Player I and defined as, when the
game starts at the node xi,
uI(xi) := sup
SI
inf
SII
V xiSI ,SII (I). (3.4)
In the same way, the largest payoff which Player I expects to receive from Player II occurs when
Player II’s strategy is subordinated to Player I’s strategy. This is called the value of the game
for Player II and defined as, for a game starting at the xi position,
uII(xi) := inf
SII
sup
SI
V xiSI ,SII (II). (3.5)
Provided uI(xi) = u
II(xi) for all xi ∈ Ω, we say that the game has a value. This means
that the pair of strategies SI , SII involved in both u
I(xi) and u
II(xi) leads to the same value
u(xi) := u
I(xi) = u
II(xi), the so called value of the game associated to xi. Note also that this
pair of strategies SI , SII needs not be unique (see Section 5.1 for an example in a variant of the
classical random Tug-of-War game) for a given xi. In other words, different pair of strategies
SI , SII associated to u
I(xi) might lead to the same value of the game for Player I, and the same
occurs with the value of the game for Player II. However, among all equivalent pair of strategies
SI , SII (if any), just one of them is optimal.
Related to this, we point out that when the game starting at xi has a value, the pair of
strategies SI , SII associated to u
I(xi) and u
II(xi) respectively, are the same. It then follows
that the game of value u(xi) is played according to this particular pair of strategies SI , SII .
We also remark that the existence of a value for the classical random Tug-of-War game (and
therefore the existence of the same and unique optimal pair of strategies for both players) was
proved in [23] using probabilistic arguments.
The value of the game associated to the classical random Tug-of-War in Ω ⊂ Rn for  > 0
fixed (this game is sometimes known as the classical random -Tug-of-War), is denoted by u and
it is not continuous in general (some examples can be found in [25, Section 3 and 4]). Related
to this, we will refer to u as the continuous value of the game, which is the uniform limit of the
game value u in Ω, as → 0.
3.4 Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP)
The function u(x), the value of the game of the classical random -Tug-of-War, is the unique
solution (see [23, 25]) of the Dirichlet problem{
u(x) =
1
2
(
supy∈B(x) u(y) + infy∈B(x) u(y)
)
+ f(x), x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ Γ,
where the expression
u(x) =
1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)
+ f(x) for all x ∈ Ω
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is known as the Dynamic Programming Principle (abbreviated as DPP). This name is motivated
by the fact that the players choose their optimal global strategy by choosing the optimal strategy
at each turn. In other words, the solution to the global problem is divided recursively into
subproblems, which are solved optimally. This has to do with Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,
which is stated below according to [2, Section 1.4 and 1.7] and [4, Section 3.3a]. In fact, this
optimality principle is the reason why the strategies for some games are independent of time
and initial position, as commented before.
Theorem 3.2 (Bellman’s Principle of Optimality). An optimal policy has the property that
whatever are the initial state and initial decision, the remaining decisions must constitute an
optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. In more simple words,
components of a globally optimal solution are themselves globally optimal.
For the case f(x) ≡ 0, it can be proved by similar arguments to those in [25, Theorem 4.11],
that the uniform limit u = lim→0 u in Ω is the unique viscosity solution to{
−∆N∞u(x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω. (3.6)
Theorem 6.1 states the analogous result for a new random Tug-of-War game presented in Chapter
4. In the case of a more general f(x), similar results are included and proved via probabilistic
arguments in [23].
According to this, the Dirichlet problem (3.6) can be given a probabilistic interpretation in
terms of game theory. This is similar to what occurs with the Dirichlet problem associated to
the Laplace equation, a probabilistic approach of which is provided by the Brownian motion.
The main difference between both problems is that all directions are equally probable for the
Brownian motion, while the classical random Tug-of-War favors only two directions, as it follows
from its DPP.

Chapter 4
Introducing a new game: the
Totalitarian Tug-of-War
4.1 Description of the game
In this chapter we introduce a new game, which we call Totalitarian Tug-of-War. This is a
variant of a classical random Tug-of-War game in which one of the players is given extra options.
More precisely, the game is played by turns starting with a token placed at a running node
x0. Then, at turn k, Player I has the power to decide whether to play a round of classical
random Tug-of-War (that is, they toss a coin and the winner decides the new game position xk+1
among the neighbors of xk), or let Player II choose the new game token position xk+1 among
the neighbors of xk in exchange of a fixed payoff of value . The fact that Player I somehow
imposes at each turn the type of game that is played, is the reason why we refer to this game as
Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
The game ends the first time the token reaches a terminal state xτ , and the payoff Player I
receives from Player II is Fτ +kτ  (the game is a two-person, zero-sum game). Fτ corresponds to
the terminal payoff at xτ and kτ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ} is a positive integer that represents the number
of times Player I has let Player II decide the next move in exchange of an -payoff throughout
the game.
Just as in the classical random Tug-of-War game, Player I wants to maximize the final payoff
that receives from Player II, who in turn wants to minimize it. In order to attain this objective,
the players follow strategies according to which they take a particular action in each turn. Note
that all terminal payoffs and the value of  are known to both players beforehand.
For a game where Players I and II adopt strategies SI and SII respectively and start the
game at position xi, the expected payoff that Player I receives from Player II is defined as
V xiSI ,SII (I) :=
{
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ], if the game ends almost surely;
−∞, otherwise, (4.1)
where ExiSI ,SII [Fτ +kτ ] represents the expected payoff that Player I receives from Player II when
they follow strategies SI and SII respectively and the game starts at the node xi. Analogously,
the expected payoff that Player II has to pay Player I is defined as
V xiSI ,SII (II) :=
{
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ], if the game ends almost surely;
+∞, otherwise. (4.2)
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Note that V xiSI ,SII (I), V
xi
SI ,SII
(II) defined in (4.1) and (4.2) respectively, can be used to assign
a value to the game in the same way as in the classical random Tug-of-War (see Section 3.3).
Namely, the value of the game for Player I when the game starts at the node xi, is defined as
uI(xi) := sup
SI
inf
SII
V xiSI ,SII (I), (4.3)
and the value of the game for Player II when the game starts at the node xi, as
uII(xi) := inf
SII
sup
SI
V xiSI ,SII (II). (4.4)
Similarly to the classical random Tug-of-War game, we say that the Totalitarian Tug-of-War
game has a value at xi provided u
I(xi) = u
II(xi), for xi the starting point of the game. We say
that the game has a value when uI = uII .
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we prove that the Totalitarian Tug-of-War has a value when played
on graphs and in bounded domains Ω ⊂ Rn respectively. A key point in the analysis of this
result is that both uI and uII , as well as the value of the game solve a Dynamic Programming
Principle. In the case of a graph, the aforementioned DPP is, for all interior nodes xi,
ui = max
{
min
j∈{i′}
uj + ,
1
2
(
max
j∈{i′}
uj + min
j∈{i′}
uj
)}
, (4.5)
where ui = u(xi) and {i′} denotes the finite set of indices associated to the nodal neighbors xi′
of xi in the graph. When the game is played in Ω ⊂ Rn, the associated DPP is
u(x) = max
{
inf
y∈B(x)
u(y) + ,
1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
for all x ∈ Ω. (4.6)
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are obtained considering the two possible choices for Player I and then
applying conditional probabilities for the coin toss.
4.2 The Totalitarian Tug-of-War on graphs has a value
We present now a novel mathematical analysis of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game played on
graphs. We refer to this game as the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War. For notational simplicity,
we will consider here the case where the graph is a segment; however, the general case follows
with the same ideas.
Let us point out that the mathematical analysis of a random Tug-of-War game is based
on its Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP), which has been already presented in Section
3.4 for the classical random Tug-of-War game. On the other hand, for the case of the discrete
Totalitarian Tug-of-War game, we will denote by N (nodes) the entire finite set of game position
indices and I (interior nodes) the set of indices for the running nodes of the game.
According to all this, the DPP associated to the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War in a discrete
graph segment, corresponds to
ui = max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ , 1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
for all i ∈ I,
where ui stands for the expected value of the game associated to the game position xi (compare
with (4.5)). Note that this DPP can be equivalently written in several different ways as follows.
Namely, for all i ∈ I,
ui = max
{
min {ui−1, ui+1}+ , 1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
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⇐⇒ ui = −min
{
−min {ui−1, ui+1} − ,−1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
⇐⇒ ui = −min
{
max {−ui−1,−ui+1} − ,−1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
⇐⇒ ui + min
{
max {−ui−1,−ui+1} − ,−1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
= 0
⇐⇒ min
{
ui + max {−ui−1,−ui+1} − , ui − 1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
= 0. (4.7)
For convenience, and in order to simplify the notation, we will refer to it as
Gi[u] = min
{
ui + max {−ui−1,−ui+1} − , ui − 1
2
(ui−1 + ui+1)
}
(4.8)
for all i ∈ I and u = (u0, . . . , un+1), so that (4.7) reads Gi[u] = 0. The combination of the DPP
with the expected value of the game at the terminal nodes, given by the bounded values Fi
for all i ∈ N\I, gives us the following Dirichlet problem associated to the discrete Totalitarian
Tug-of-War: {
Gi[u] = 0, i ∈ I;
ui = Fi, i ∈ N\I.
(4.9)
Related to this is the following proposition, which is derived considering the two possible
choices for Player I and then applying conditional probabilities for the coin toss.
Proposition 4.1. The value functions of the game for Players I and II, uIi and u
II
i respectively,
are both solution to the discrete Dirichlet problem (4.9).
We intend to provide in an upcoming work another proof of Proposition 4.1 in the line of
[20], where an alternative and more precise proof of [23, Lemma 1.1] is given.
The importance of Proposition 4.1 lies on the fact that it allows us to apply PDE methods
to study uIi and u
II
i . In particular, a key novelty that we introduce in our analysis is a discrete
comparison principle (see Theorem 4.2 below). This result allows us to prove that (4.9) has
a unique solution and therefore conclude that the game has a value without appealing to
probabilistic arguments.
4.2.1 A discrete comparison principle on graphs
Now follows the statement and proof of a discrete comparison principle, Theorem 4.2, which is
one of the key results of this section as commented before.
Theorem 4.2. Let u and v be respectively a subsolution and supersolution of (4.7), i.e.,
Gi[u] ≤ 0 ≤ Gi[v] for all i ∈ I, where Gi is defined in (4.8). Assume also that v is bounded from
above and ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N\I. Then ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N .
An important consequence of Theorem 4.2 is the following bound.
Proposition 4.3. Let ui be a solution to the Dirichlet problem (4.9) and Fi bounded for all
i ∈ N\I. Then, for all i ∈ N and K = maxi∈N\I |Fi|,
min{(n+ 1)− i, i} −K ≤ ui ≤ min{(n+ 1)− i, i}+K.
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Proof. Consider, for Fi the same in (4.9), the Dirichlet problem{
Gi[v] = 0, i ∈ I;
vi = K, i ∈ N\I,
a solution of which is vi = min{(n+ 1)− i, i}+K. Then, since it is bounded for all i ∈ N , by
Theorem 4.2 it follows that ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N and therefore the upper bound for ui is proved.
About the lower bound of ui, consider now the Dirichlet problem{
Gi[v] = 0, i ∈ I;
vi = −K, i ∈ N\I,
a solution of which is vi = min{(n+ 1)− i, i} −K. On the other hand, since ui is a solution to
(4.9) by hypothesis, it is in particular a supersolution and bounded from above due to the first
part of the proof. Then, by Theorem 4.2 it follows that vi ≤ ui for all i ∈ N and the proof is
finished.
The following lemma, which is just the segment version of Lemma 4.13, is necessary for the
proof of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma 4.4. Let v be a supersolution to Gi[v] = 0 and bounded from above for all i ∈ N .
Then, for every γ > 0 there exists a supersolution v˜ to the equation Gi[v˜] = µ for some constant
µ = µ(γ, v) > 0. Moreover, v˜i − vi ≤ γ for all i ∈ I and v˜i − vi ≥ −γ for all i ∈ N\I.
Proof. We look for v˜ of the form v˜i = g(vi) for all i ∈ I, where
g(α) = (1 + ε)α− ε
4C
α2
for ε > 0 and C = maxi∈I |vi| (recall that v is bounded from above by hypothesis). The constant
γ in the statement of the lemma will be chosen later as a function of ε.
We assume, without loss of generality, that max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1} = vi − vi−1. Note also
that max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1} −  ≥ 0, in view of (4.7). According to all this,
max{v˜i − v˜i−1, v˜i − v˜i+1} −  = max{g(vi)− g(vi−1), g(vi)− g(vi+1)} − 
= max
{
(1 + ε) (vi − vi−1)− ε
4C
(v2i − v2i−1),
(1 + ε) (vi − vi+1)− ε
4C
(v2i − v2i+1)
}
− 
= max
{(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
(vi + vi−1)
)
(vi − vi−1),(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
(vi + vi+1)
)
(vi − vi+1)
}
− 
≥
(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
2C
)
(vi − vi−1)− 
=
(
1 +
ε
2
)
(vi − vi−1)− 
≥
(
1 +
ε
2
)
− 
=
ε
2
.
On the other hand,
(v˜i − v˜i−1) + (v˜i − v˜i+1) = (g(vi)− g(vi−1)) + (g(vi)− g(vi+1))
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= (1 + ε) ((vi − vi−1) + (vi − vi+1))− ε
4C
(
v2i − v2i−1
)− ε
4C
(
v2i − v2i+1
)
= (1 + ε) (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + ε
4C
(−2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1) .
Note that
− 2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1 = −2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1 ±
(
2v2i + 2vi vi−1 + 2vi vi+1
)
= −2v2i + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2 + 2vi vi−1 + 2vi vi+1 − 2v2i
= −4v2i + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2 + 2vi (vi−1 + vi+1)
= −2vi (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2.
From these, it follows that
(v˜i − v˜i−1) + (v˜i − v˜i+1) = (1 + ε) (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + ε
4C
(−2v2i + v2i−1 + v2i+1)
= (1 + ε) (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1)
+
ε
4C
(−2vi (2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + (vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2)
=
(
1 + ε− ε vi
2C
)
(2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + ε
4C
(
(vi−1 − vi)2 + (vi+1 − vi)2
)
≥
(
1 + ε− ε vi
2C
)
(2vi − vi−1 − vi+1) + ε
4C
(max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1})2
≥ ε
4C
2,
where in the last inequality we have used that, since Gi[v] ≥ 0 by hypothesis for all i ∈ I,
2vi − vi−1 − vi+1 ≥ 0 and max{vi − vi−1, vi − vi+1} ≥ .
Then, according to the previous results, we get that
min
{
v˜i + max {−v˜i−1,−v˜i+1} − , v˜i − 1
2
(v˜i−1 + v˜i+1)
}
≥ min
{ε
2
,
ε
8C
2
}
=
ε
2
 min
{
1,

4C
}
= µ
for all i ∈ I, where µ = µ(ε, v) > 0.
About the second part of this lemma, since g(α) − α ≤ 34 εC for α ≤ C and because
v˜i = g(vi), it follows that v˜i−vi ≤ 34 εC for all i ∈ I. Similarly, since g(α)−α ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
for α ≥ −D = − ∣∣mini∈N\I vi∣∣, it follows that v˜i − vi ≥ −εD (1 + D4C ) for all i ∈ N\I. The
results hold for every
γ = εmax
{
3
4
C, D
(
1 +
D
4C
)}
> 0,
provided ε is small enough.
We proceed now with the proof of the discrete comparison principle, Theorem 4.2, which is
inspired by the proof of Theorem 4.10 in the continuous domain Ω ⊂ Rn.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Arguing by contradiction, we suppose that maxi∈N (ui − vi) > 0. Since
ui ≤ vi for all i ∈ N\I, it follows that there is an index j ∈ I such that uj − vj = maxi∈N (ui −
vi) > 0. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.4, for every γ > 0 there exists v˜ such that v˜i − vi ≤ γ
for all i ∈ I. As a result, uj − vj > γ ≥ v˜j − vj for γ small enough and therefore uj > v˜j .
This implies that there is an index k ∈ N such that uk − v˜k = maxi∈N (uk − v˜k) > 0. In
fact, k ∈ I since by Lemma 4.4, we can assume v˜i − vi ≥ −γ for all i ∈ N\I and therefore
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uk − v˜k > γ ≥ vi − v˜i ≥ ui − v˜i for all i ∈ N\I. For the sake of simplicity let us assume this
index k to be j.
It follows by definition that
uj − v˜j ≥ ui − v˜i for all i ∈ N .
In particular uj − uj−1 ≥ v˜j − v˜j−1 and uj − uj+1 ≥ v˜j − v˜j+1. According to this and writing
(4.7) as
min {max {ui − ui−1, ui − ui+1} − , (ui − ui−1) + (ui − ui+1)} = 0,
we have that Gj [v˜] ≤ Gj [u], in terms of (4.8). Combining this with the fact that, by Lemma 4.4,
Gi[u] < Gi[v˜] for all i ∈ I, it follows Gi[u] < Gj [v˜] ≤ Gj [u] for all i ∈ I. Setting i = j yields a
contradiction.
A result that follows directly from Theorem 4.2 is the following maximum principle.
Corollary 4.5. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4.2 and provided ui is bounded from
above for all i ∈ N\I, it holds
max
i∈N
(ui − vi) = max
i∈N\I
(ui − vi).
Proof. Let K be a constant such that ui −K ≤ vi for all i ∈ N\I. Since Gi[u−K] = Gi[u] ≤ 0
for all i ∈ I, ui −K is a subsolution of equation (4.7). Then, by Theorem 4.2 we have that, for
all i ∈ N , ui −K ≤ vi, i.e., ui − vi ≤ K. The result follows by taking K = maxi∈N\I(ui − vi),
which is finite since ui and −vi are both bounded from above for all i ∈ N\I.
4.2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the value of the game
As it occurs with the classical random Tug-of-War game, the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War
has a value associated to the position xi for i ∈ N , denoted as ui, provided that ui := uIi = uIIi ,
for uIi , u
II
i the respective expected value of the game for Players I and II at xi. Therefore, in
order to prove that the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value, i.e., uIi = u
II
i for all
i ∈ N , it will be enough to show that both uIi ≤ uIIi and uIIi ≤ uIi hold for all i ∈ N .
Remark 4.6. If the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War ends almost surely, then the value of
the game for Player I, (4.3), and II, (4.4), is finite. This is so in view of (4.1) and (4.2), and
the fact that for every game that ends almost surely, the number of coin tosses is finite and so
it is ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ]. Hence, u
I
i and u
II
i are both bounded in all the game nodes. Note also
that, since we are assuming that Fi is bounded for all i ∈ N\I, it is derived that if the discrete
Totalitarian Tug-of-War has a finite value, the game ends almost surely. This is clear since,
according to (4.1) and (4.2), the only possibility for the game to have an infinite value is that it
does not end.
At this point, the following result provides one of the two inequalities necessary to guarantee
the existence (and uniqueness) of a value for the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
Proposition 4.7. It holds that uIi ≤ uIIi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Note first that, by definition,
V xiSI ,SII (I) ≤ V xiSI ,SII (II) for all i ∈ N .
According to this, it holds
inf
SII
V xiSI ,SII (I) ≤ sup
SI
V xiSI ,SII (II) for all i ∈ N .
4.3. The -Totalitarian Tug-of-War in Rn has a value 33
Then, it follows
sup
SI
inf
SII
V xiSI ,SII (I) ≤ sup
SI
V xiSI ,SII (II) for all i ∈ N ,
and since the left-hand side of the inequality holds for all SII , one finally gets
uIi = sup
SI
inf
SII
V xiSI ,SII (I) ≤ infSII supSI
V xiSI ,SII (II) = u
II
i for all i ∈ N .
It remains to prove that uIIi ≤ uIi holds for all i ∈ N (see Theorem 4.8). Then, we will be
able to conclude the existence and uniqueness of the game value for the discrete Totalitarian
Tug-of-War.
Theorem 4.8. The discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value, which is unique.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Let uIi , u
II
i be the respective value of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War game
for Players I and II, for i ∈ N . By Proposition 4.1, both uIi and uIIi are solutions to the
discrete Dirichlet problem (4.9) and hence, according to Proposition 4.3 they are bounded for all
i ∈ N (note that the boundedness follows alternatively by Remark 4.6). In particular, they are
respectively a supersolution and subsolution of (4.7) for all i ∈ N and uIIi ≤ uIi for all i ∈ N\I.
Thus, we can apply Theorem 4.2 for ui = u
II
i and vi = u
I
i , so that u
II
i ≤ uIi for all i ∈ N . On
the other hand, by Proposition 4.7, uIi ≤ uIIi for all i ∈ N . It then follows that uIIi = uIi for all
i ∈ N so that the discrete Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a unique value.
Just to mention that a more exhaustive analysis on discretized degenerate elliptic equations
and its use in numerical analysis can be found in [21], for instance.
4.3 The -Totalitarian Tug-of-War in Rn has a value
A similar analysis to the one in the previous section is considered now for the Totalitarian
Tug-of-War game played on a bounded domain Ω ⊂ Rn, instead of a finite set of points (discrete
case). For  > 0 fixed, we denote the compact boundary strip of width  by
Γ = {x ∈ Rn\Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ }.
Note that this is the same boundary strip (3.1) presented in Section 3.1 for the classical random
Tug-of-War game.
More precisely, we are considering a Totalitarian Tug-of-War game that is played in the way
described in Section 4.1, but now the players can move the game token (currently placed at
y ∈ Ω) to any position x ∈ B(y), where  > 0 is fixed at the beginning of the game. This is
why we refer to this game as the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
The Dynamic Programming Principle associated to the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War game is
u(x) = max
{
inf
y∈B(x)
u(y) + ,
1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
for all x ∈ Ω
and can be equivalently written, following the same argument that we did for the derivation of
(4.7), as
min
{
u(x)− inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)− , u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
= 0 (4.10)
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for all x ∈ Ω. For our convenience and in order to simplify the notation, we will denote
G[u](x) = min
{
u(x)− inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)− , u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
y∈B(x)
u(y) + inf
y∈B(x)
u(y)
)}
,
(4.11)
so that (4.10) reads G[u](x) = 0.
The Dirichlet problem that results from the combination of the DPP (4.10) and the expected
value of the game on its domain boundary Γ, for F : Γ → R a bounded function, corresponds
to {
G[u](x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ Γ.
(4.12)
Related to this is the following proposition, that is derived considering the two possible
choices for Player I and then applying conditional probabilities for the coin toss.
Proposition 4.9. The value functions for Players I and II of the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War
game, uI (x) and u
II
 (x) respectively, are both solution to the Dirichlet problem (4.12).
We intend to provide in an upcoming work a proof of Proposition 4.9 in the line of [20],
where an alternative and more precise proof of [23, Lemma 1.1] is given.
The importance of Proposition 4.9 lies on the fact that it allows us to apply partial differential
equation methods to study uI (x) and u
II
 (x). In particular, a key novelty that we introduce
in our analysis is a discrete comparison principle (see Theorem 4.10 below) which allows us
to prove that (4.12) has a unique solution and therefore conclude that the game has a value
without appealing to probabilistic arguments.
4.3.1 A comparison principle for the DPP
Now follows the statement and proof of a discrete comparison principle, Theorem 4.10, which is
one of the key results of this section as commented before.
Theorem 4.10. Let the functions u, v : Ω ∪ Γ → R be respectively a subsolution and
supersolution of (4.10), i.e., G[u] ≤ 0 ≤ G[v] in Ω, where G is defined in (4.11). Assume also
that u is bounded from above in Ω ∪ Γ, v is bounded from above and below in Ω ∪ Γ and
u ≤ v in Γ. Then u ≤ v in Ω ∪ Γ.
A result which follows from Theorem 4.10 is the following proposition.
Proposition 4.11. Let u be a solution to the Dirichlet problem (4.12) and F : ∂Ω → R
bounded. Then, for all x ∈ Ω := Ω ∪ Γ and K = ‖F‖∞,Γ ,
dist(x, ∂Ω)−K −  ≤ u(x) ≤ dist(x, ∂Ω) +K. (4.13)
Proof. Consider, for F (x) the same in (4.12), the Dirichlet problem{
G[v](x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
v(x) = K, x ∈ Γ,
(4.14)
a supersolution of which is v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) +K. To see this, let
M = {x ∈ Ω : ‖dist(·, ∂Ω)‖∞,Ω ≤ dist(x, ∂Ω) + } (4.15)
and observe that
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i) when x ∈M, on the one hand
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v = (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− inf
B(x)
(dist(·, ∂Ω) +K)
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− inf
B(x)
dist(·, ∂Ω)−K
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− (dist(x, ∂Ω)− )−K
= ,
and on the other hand,
v(x)− sup
B(x)
v = (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− sup
B(x)
(dist(·, ∂Ω) +K)
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− sup
B(x)
dist(·, ∂Ω)−K
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− ‖dist(·, ∂Ω)‖∞,B(x) −K
≥ (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− (dist(x, ∂Ω) + )−K
= −,
where the inequality follows from (4.15). By adding up the two previous expressions, one
gets (
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v
)
+
(
v(x)− sup
B(x)
v
)
≥ −  = 0.
Thus, v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) +K is a supersolution to G[v] = 0 in M.
ii) When x ∈ Ω\M, on the one hand
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v = ,
as before, and on the other hand
v(x)− sup
B(x)
v = (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− sup
B(x)
(dist(·, ∂Ω) +K)
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− sup
B(x)
dist(·, ∂Ω)−K
= (dist(x, ∂Ω) +K)− (dist(x, ∂Ω) + )−K
= −.
Adding up the two last expressions, one gets(
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v
)
+
(
v(x)− sup
B(x)
v
)
= −  = 0,
so that it follows that v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) +K is a solution to G[v] = 0 in Ω\M.
iii) Finally, when x ∈ Γ, it is clear that dist(x, ∂Ω) +K ≥ K since dist(x, ∂Ω) ≥ 0. That is,
v ≥ K in Γ.
Thus, we conclude that v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) + K is a supersolution to the Dirichlet problem
(4.14) and then also to (4.12). Moreover, since v(x) is bounded in Ω, by Theorem 4.10 it
follows that u ≤ v in Ω and therefore the upper bound for u is proved.
About the lower bound of u, consider now the Dirichlet problem{
G[v](x) = 0, x ∈ Ω;
v(x) = −K, x ∈ Γ,
(4.16)
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a subsolution of which is v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω)−K − . In order to prove this, note first that the
same computations which prove that v is a supersolution of (4.14) apply here. That is, for all
x ∈ Ω it holds
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v −  = 0 and
(
v(x)− inf
B(x)
v
)
+
(
v(x)− sup
B(x)
v
)
≥ 0. (4.17)
Therefore, v = dist(x, ∂Ω)−K −  is a solution to G[v] = 0 in Ω, since G[v] is the minimum
of the two quantities in (4.17). When x ∈ Γ, we have that dist(x, ∂Ω)−K −  ≤ −K since
dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ , so that v ≤ −K in Γ.
Hence, v = dist(x, ∂Ω) − K −  is a subsolution to the Dirichlet problem (4.16) and
consequently to (4.12). On the other hand, since u is a solution to (4.12) by hypothesis, it is in
particular a supersolution and bounded from above due to the first part of the proof. Then, by
Theorem 4.10 it follows that v ≤ u in Ω and the proof is finished.
As a consequence, we get the following uniform bound.
Remark 4.12. For a given value of  > 0 fixed, it follows from Proposition 4.11 that, for all
x ∈ Ω∪Γ, u is uniformly bounded with respect to , provided  is small enough. That is, taking
 = 1 for instance and in view of (4.13), it holds for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ that
dist(x,Ω1)− ‖F‖∞,Γ1 − 1 ≤ u(x) ≤ dist(x,Ω1) + ‖F‖∞,Γ1 .
The following lemma, which is a simpler version (a discrete case) of Lemma 6.10, is necessary
for the proof of Theorem 6.3.
Lemma 4.13. Let v : Ω ∪ Γ → R be a supersolution to G[v] = 0, bounded from above in
Ω ∪ Γ. Then, for every γ > 0 there exists a function v˜ : Ω ∪ Γ → R which is a supersolution
to the equation G[v˜] = µ for some constant µ = µ(γ, v) > 0. Moreover, v˜ − v ≤ γ in Ω and
v˜ − v ≥ −γ in Γ.
Proof. We look for v˜ of the form v˜ = g(v), where
g(α) = (1 + ε)α− ε
4C
α2
for ε > 0 and C a positive constant such that supΩ∪Γ v ≤ C (v is bounded from above by
hypothesis). The constant γ in the statement of the lemma will be chosen later as a function of
ε.
According to this,
v˜(x)− inf
B(x)
v˜ −  = g(v)− g
(
inf
B(x)
v
)
− 
= (1 + ε) v − ε
4C
v2 − (1 + ε)
(
inf
B(x)
v
)
+
ε
4C
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2
− 
= (1 + ε)
(
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− ε
4C
v2 −
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2− 
= (1 + ε)
(
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− ε
4C
(
v + inf
B(x)
v
)(
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− 
=
(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
(
v + inf
B(x)
v
)) (
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− 
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≥
(
(1 + ε)− ε
4C
2C
) (
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− 
=
(
1 +
ε
2
) (
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
− 
≥
(
1 +
ε
2
)
− 
=
ε
2
,
where we used the fact that v(x)− infB(x) v −  ≥ 0, since G[v] ≥ 0 in Ω.
On the other hand,(
v˜ − inf
B(x)
v˜
)
+
(
v˜ − sup
B(x)
v˜
)
=
(
g(v)− g
(
inf
B(x)
v
))
+
(
g(v)− g
(
sup
B(x)
v
))
= (1 + ε)
((
v − inf
B(x)
v
)
+
(
v − sup
B(x)
v
))
− ε
4C
v2 −
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2− ε
4C
v2 −
(
sup
B(x)
v
)2
= (1 + ε)
(
2v − inf
B(x)
v − sup
B(x)
v
)
+
ε
4C
−2v2 +
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v
)2 .
Note that
− 2v2 +
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v
)2
= −2v2 +
(
inf
B(x)
v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v
)2
±
(
2v2 + 2v inf
B(x)
v + 2v sup
B(x)
v
)
= −2v2 +
( inf
B(x)
v
)2
− 2v inf
B(x)
v + v
2

+
( sup
B(x)
v
)2
− 2v sup
B(x)
v + v
2


+ 2v inf
B(x)
v + 2v sup
B(x)
v − 2v2
= −4v2 +
(
inf
B(x)
v − v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v − v
)2
+ 2v
(
inf
B(x)
v + sup
B(x)
v
)
= −2v
(
2v − inf
B(x)
v − sup
B(x)
v
)
+
(
inf
B(x)
v − v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v − v
)2
.
From these, it follows that(
v˜ − inf
B(x)
v˜
)
+
(
v˜ − sup
B(x)
v˜
)
= (1 + ε)
(
2v − inf
B(x)
v − sup
B(x)
v
)
+
ε
4C
−2v(2v − inf
B(x)
v − sup
B(x)
v
)
+
(
inf
B(x)
v − v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v − v
)2
=
(
1 + ε− ε v
2C
) (
2v − inf
B(x)
v − sup
B(x)
v
)
+
ε
4C
( inf
B(x)
v − v
)2
+
(
sup
B(x)
v − v
)2
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≥ ε
4C
2,
where in the last inequality we have used that 2v − infB(x) v − supB(x) v ≥ 0 and v −
infB(x) v −  ≥ 0, since G[v] ≥ 0 in Ω by hypothesis.
Then, according to the previous computations we get that
min
{(
v˜(x)− inf
B(x)
v˜
)
− , v˜(x)− 1
2
(
sup
B(x)
v˜ + inf
B(x)
v˜
)}
≥ min
{ε
2
,
ε
8C
2
}
=
ε
2
 min
{
1,

4C
}
= µ
for all x ∈ Ω, where µ = µ(ε, v) > 0.
About the second part of the lemma, since g(α) − α ≤ 34 εC for α ≤ C and because
v˜ = g(v), it follows that v˜ − v ≤ 34 εC in Ω. Similarly, since g(α)− α ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
for
α ≥ −D = − |minΓ v|, it follows that v˜−v ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
in Γ. The results hold for every
γ = εmax
{
3
4
C, D
(
1 +
D
4C
)}
> 0,
provided ε is small enough.
We proceed now with the proof of the discrete comparison principle, Theorem 4.10, which is
inspired by the proof of Theorem 6.3 in the continuous case.
Proof of Theorem 4.10. Arguing by contradiction, we suppose that supΩ∪Γ(u − v) > 0. Since
Ω ∪ Γ is compact and both u and −v are bounded from above by hypothesis, the supremum
is attained (this is just the extension to semicontinuous functions of the extreme value theorem).
And because u ≤ v in Γ, it follows that there is a point xˆ ∈ Ω such that (u − v)(xˆ) =
maxΩ∪Γ(u − v) > 0. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.13, for every γ > 0 there exists a
function v˜ such that v˜ − v ≤ γ in Ω. As a result, u(xˆ) − v(xˆ) > γ ≥ v˜(xˆ) − v(xˆ) for γ
small enough and therefore u(xˆ) > v˜(xˆ).
This implies that there is a point x˜ ∈ Ω∪ Γ such that u(x˜)− v˜(x˜) = supΩ∪Γ(u − v˜) > 0.
Note that the supremum is attained since −v˜ is bounded from above by construction. In fact,
x˜ ∈ Ω since by Lemma 4.13, we can assume v˜ − v ≥ −γ in Γ and therefore u(x˜)− v˜(x˜) >
γ ≥ v(x)− v˜(x) ≥ u(x)− v˜(x) for all x ∈ Γ. For the sake of simplicity let us assume this
point x˜ to be xˆ.
It follows by definition that
u(xˆ)− v˜(xˆ) ≥ u(x)− v˜(x) for all x ∈ Ω,
which is equivalent to say u(xˆ)− u(x) ≥ v˜(xˆ)− v˜(x) for all x ∈ Ω. According to this and
writing (4.10) as
min
{
sup
y∈B(xˆ)
(u(xˆ)− u(y))− , sup
y∈B(xˆ)
(u(xˆ)− u(y)) + inf
y∈B(xˆ)
(u(xˆ)− u(y))
}
= 0,
(4.18)
we have that G[v˜](xˆ) ≤ G[u](xˆ), where G is given by (4.11). The combination of this inequality
with the fact that by Lemma 4.13 one gets G[u] < G[v˜] in Ω, yields a contradiction.
Remark 4.14. Expression (4.18) displays the DPP (4.10) as a discrete elliptic, and in particular
monotone, scheme in the language of [21] and [3] respectively. Discrete ellipticity in our case
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amounts to showing (see [21, Definition 2]) that, for a given x ∈ Ω, (4.18) is a non-decreasing
fucntion of u(x) and the differences
u(x)− u(y) whenever y 6= x,
which is satisfied by (4.18). On the other hand, monotonicity requires (4.18) to be non-increasing
as a function of u(y), y 6= x, for u(x) fixed (see [3, Section 2]), which is also satisfied by (4.18).
Let us recall that discrete ellipticity implies monotonicity, as pointed out in [21].
A result that follows directly from Theorem 4.10 is the following maximum principle.
Corollary 4.15. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4.10, it holds
sup
x∈Ω∪Γ
(u(x)− v(x)) = sup
x∈Γ
(u(x)− v(x)).
Proof. Let K be a constant such that u −K ≤ v on Γ. Since G[u −K] = G[u] ≤ 0 in Ω,
u −K is a subsolution of equation (4.10) and bounded from above in Ω ∪ Γ, as it is u. By
Theorem 4.10 we have that in Ω ∪ Γ, u −K ≤ v, i.e., u − v ≤ K. Hence, the result follows
by taking K = supΓ(u − v), which is finite since Γ is compact and u and −v are bounded
from above in Ω ∪ Γ by hypothesis (this is just the extension to semicontinuous functions of
the extreme value theorem).
4.3.2 Existence and uniqueness of the value of the game
In a similar way to classical random Tug-of-War (see Chapter 3), we say that an -Totalitarian
Tug-of-War game (see Chapter 4) has a value associated to the point x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ, denoted as
u(x), provided that u(x) := u
I
 (x) = u
II
 (x), for u
I
 (x), u
II
 (x) the respective expected values
of the game for Players I and II at x. Therefore, in order to prove that an -Tug-of-War game
has a value, i.e., uI (x) = u
II
 (x) for all x ∈ Ω∪ Γ, it will be enough to show that both uI ≤ uII
and uII ≤ uI hold in Ω ∪ Γ.
Remark 4.16. If the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War ends almost surely, then the value of the game
for Player I, (4.3), and II, (4.4), is finite. This is so in view of (4.1) and (4.2), and the fact
that for every game that ends almost surely, the number of coin tosses is finite and so it is
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ]. Hence, u
I
 and u
II
 are both bounded in all the game domain. Note also that,
since we are assuming that F (x) is bounded for all x ∈ Γ, it is derived that if the -Totalitarian
Tug-of-War has a finite value, the game ends almost surely. This is clear since, according to
(4.1) and (4.2), the only possibility for the game to have an infinite value is that it does not end.
At this point, the following result provides us with one of the two inequalities necessary to
guarantee the existence (and uniqueness) of a value for the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
Proposition 4.17. It holds that uI (x) ≤ uII (x) for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ.
Proof. Note first that, by definition,
V xSI ,SII (I) ≤ V xSI ,SII (II) for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ.
According to this, it holds
inf
SII
V xSI ,SII (I) ≤ sup
SI
V xSI ,SII (II) for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ.
Then, it follows
sup
SI
inf
SII
V xSI ,SII (I) ≤ sup
SI
V xSI ,SII (II) for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ,
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and since the left-hand side holds for all SII , one finally gets
uI (x) = sup
SI
inf
SII
V xSI ,SII (I) ≤ infSII supSI
V xSI ,SII (II) = u
II
 (x) for all x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ.
It remains to prove that uII ≤ uI holds in Ω ∪ Γ for the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War (see
Theorem 4.18). Then, we will be able to conclude the existence and uniqueness of the game
value for the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War.
Theorem 4.18. The -Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a value, which is unique.
Proof of Theorem 4.18. Let uI (x), u
II
 (x) be the respective values of the -Totalitarian Tug-of-
War for Players I and II at x ∈ Ω ∪ Γ. By Proposition 4.9 both uI and uII are solutions to
the Dirichlet problem (4.12) and hence, according to Proposition 4.11 they are bounded in
Ω ∪ Γ (note that the boundedness follows alternatively by Remark 4.16). In particular, they
are respectively a supersolution and subsolution of (4.10) in Ω and uII ≤ uI in Γ. Thus, we
can apply Theorem 4.10 for u = u
II
 and v = u
I
 , so that u
II
 ≤ uI in Ω ∪ Γ. On the other
hand, by Proposition 4.17, uI ≤ uII in Ω ∪ Γ. It then follows that uII = uI in Ω ∪ Γ so that
the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War game has a unique value.
Chapter 5
Examples of Totalitarian
Tug-of-War on graphs
This chapter is devoted to four examples of the Totalitarian Tug-of-War, introduced in Chapter
4, played on graphs. More precisely, we describe in detail the game for a graph in a segment
with two running and terminal nodes. Adding an extra terminal node to this graph, one gets
the configuration (Y -shape) of the graph for a different example. Finally, the generalization to
n running nodes of the two previous cases are the remaining examples.
5.1 Game on a segment with two running nodes
5.1.1 Configuration of the game
Consider a random Tug-of-War game, the positions of which are represented in Figure 5.1,
played in the following way. If the game token is at a running node, either x1 or x2, Player I
can either play a round of classical random Tug-of-War game (see Section 3.1) with Player II
in that game position or let Player II move the game token to any adjacent game position. In
the second case, Player I will receive in return a payment of value  from Player II. The game
proceeds according to these instructions until a terminal node is reached, namely, x0 or x3.
When the game token reaches a terminal node the game ends and Player I receives from
Player II a final payoff. This value depends on each particular terminal node xi, so we will
denote it as Fi. The final payoff is independent of the -payments that took place throughout the
game and as it occurs with the particular value of , all Fi are fixed and known to both players
beforehand. Just to mention that due to the symmetry of the game positions configuration (see
Figure 5.1) we can assume without loss of generality that F0 ≤ F3.
x0 x1 x2 x3
Figure 5.1: Game positions of the game on a segment with two running nodes.
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S∗I (x1) S
x2
I (x1)
Sx0II (x1) A B
S∗I (x2) S
x3
I (x2) S
x1
I (x2)
Sx1II (x2) 1 2 3
Sx3II (x2) 4 5 6
Table 5.1: Table of all possible pairs of strategies for the game on a segment with two running
nodes.
5.1.2 Game strategies
According to the description of the game, both players can choose between two possible actions
at each running node. However, Player II should always move the game token from x1 to the
terminal node x0, whenever possible, since doing otherwise is against his/her interest (this
behavior is reasonable since we are assuming that both players are playing optimally). Taking
this into account, Table 5.1 shows all possible strategies of the game, labeling with a letter A or
B and a number from 1 to 6 all possible combinations of actions of both players for all running
nodes (a letter when the game token is in the running node x1 and a number when the game
token is in the running node x2).
These actions are indicated as S
xp
α (xi), where α ∈ {I, II} indicates the player who is taking
that action, xp (p = 0, 1, 2, 3) is the node that player α wants to be the new game token position,
∗ means that Player I lets Player II choose the new game token position, and xi (i = 1, 2) stands
for the current position of the game token.
5.1.3 Value of the game
Once the action of both players in all running nodes is established, we are able to compute the
expected value of the game associated to this particular pair of strategies for all game positions.
We denote the expected value of the game at node xi as ui (recall that the expected value of
the game at the terminal nodes x0 and x3 is respectively u0 = F0 and u3 = F3).
The computation of the expected value of the game ui at the running nodes xi (i = 1, 2) is
ui = uq +  for S
∗
I (xi) and S
xq
II (xi) (5.1)
and
ui =
1
2
(up + uq) for S
xp
I (xi) and S
xq
II (xi). (5.2)
Proceeding in the way detailed in (5.1) and (5.2) with all pairs of strategies that derive from
Table 5.1, we end up with the following expected values of the game u1 and u2, for each given
pair of strategies:
A1 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 2
A2 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 =
1
2 (F0 + F3 + )
A3 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 
A4 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F3 + 
A5 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F3
A6 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 =
1
2 (F0 + F3 + )
B1 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 2
B2 :
{
u1 =
1
3 (2F0 + F3)
u2 =
1
3 (F0 + 2F3)
B3 :
{
u1 = F0
u2 = F0
(5.3)
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B3
A=B1
B2=B6
B5
B4
(-1)
(0)
(0)
(-1)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0
)
(-1)
(-1)
Figure 5.2: Directed graph where the nodes are the pairs of strategies described in Table 5.1
and computed in (5.3), and edges point towards the largest expected value of the game at the
x1-node. The letter A stands for all possible combinations Ax, x = 1, . . . , 6.
B4 :
{
u1 =
1
2 (F0 + F3 + )
u2 = F3 + 
B5 :
{
u1 =
1
2 (F0 + F3)
u2 = F3
B6 :
{
u1 =
1
3 (2F0 + F3)
u2 =
1
3 (F0 + 2F3)
Through the comparison of the values ui among all pairs of strategies, we are able to
construct, for each fixed i, a directed graph where the nodes are the pairs of strategies and the
edges relate each pair of strategies with different associated value ui (pairs of strategies with the
same associated value ui are represented by the same node), see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. Each
edge points towards the node with largest value ui between the two nodes that the edge relates.
Note that, when trying to establish an order among all pairs of strategies for the value ui,
some conditions appear. In our particular example, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the directed
graph comparing all possible pairs of strategies associated to the values u1 and u2, respectively.
On each edge it is indicated the condition which must hold so that the edge points towards the
pair of strategies with largest expected value of the game, u1 in Figure 5.2 and u2 in Figure
5.3. We summarize all the conditions appearing at some edge, in either one or both graphs, as
follows: 
(−1) :  > 0,
(0) : F0 < F3,
(1) : F0 +  < F3,
(1.5) : F0 + 1.5 < F3,
(2) : F0 + 2 < F3,
(3) : F0 + 3 < F3.
(5.4)
In case some condition in (5.4) does not hold, this means that the reverse inequality is
satisfied and therefore the edges associated to such condition in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 have to be
reversed.
Now we are ready to compute the value of the game for each player at each running node.
According to (4.1) and under the assumption that the game ends almost surely (see Remark 4.6
for an extended comment), the value of the game for Player I in our case reads as
uIi = sup
SI
inf
SII
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ], (5.5)
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B3
A3
A1=B1
A2=A6
B2=B6
A5=B5
A4=B4
(0
)
(-1)
(3)
(-
1)
(-1)
(-1)
(1)
(0)
(3)
(3
)
(2
)
(1.5)
(1)
(-1)
(-1)
(0)
(-1
)
(-1)
(0)
(1)
(1)
Figure 5.3: Directed graph where the nodes are the pairs of strategies described in Table 5.1
and computed in (5.3), and edges point towards the largest expected value of the game at the
x2-node.
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Similarly, the value of the game for Player II is written here as
uIIi = inf
SII
sup
SI
ExiSI ,SII [Fτ + kτ ]. (5.6)
As we already explained in detail in Section 4.1, the game starting at the node xi will have a
value provided uIi = u
II
i , which holds according to Theorem 4.8. Here, we are going to compute
this value explicitly in the case of the current game.
Let us assume, for instance, that all conditions in (5.4) hold, so that the orientations of the
edges in the directed graphs displayed in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are correct. We are going to show
that the pairs of strategies B2 and B6 in Table 5.1, which have associated the same value of the
game u1 in x1, and u2 in x2, are the only pair of strategies which fulfill the expressions (5.5)
and (5.6), that is, uIi and u
II
i for i = 1, 2.
In order to conclude that B2 or B6 are the pairs of strategies SI , SII that the players should
follow, one can reason in the following way. According to the expression (5.5) for uIi , Player II
chooses his/her strategy first, taking into account that Player I will choose, afterwards, the best
among all compatible strategy. At node x1, Player II has just one possible action according to
Table 5.1, move to x0 (denoted S
x0
II (x1) in the strategies notation, commented above). At game
position x2, Player II will decide to move to x1 (S
x1
II (x2) in the strategies notation).
Then, the compatible strategies available for Player I to choose yield either A or B and 1 or
2 or 3. Note that the expected value of the game associated to these choices is smaller than
the one associated to A or B and 4 or 5 or 6, but the latter are not compatible with Player II’s
choice, according to Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Among the compatible strategies, Sx2I (x1) and S
x3
I (x2)
is the strategy that maximizes uIi for i = 1, 2 and therefore the strategy to be chosen by Player
I. Hence, we conclude that B2 is the pair of strategies associated to uIi for i = 1, 2.
Remark 5.1. The pairs of strategies associated to uIi for i = 1, 2 is B2, but B6 brings associated
the same expected value uIi , so that formally it is also a valid choice. However, looking at the
behavior of the players if they follow B6, one realizes that this pair of strategies is a classical
random Tug-of-War game where players interchange their roles. That is, with this pair of
strategies, both players make choices that are opposite to their original goals (while in x1 Player
I wants to move towards x3 and Player II wants to move towards x0, in x2 Player I wants to
move towards x0 and Player II wants to move towards x3).
This is an unstable equilibrium, since both players would be able to get a higher expected
payoff by changing their own strategy (this situation is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, fully
analyzed in [24]). This argument leads us to say that B2 is the only optimal strategy associated
to uIi for i = 1, 2.
Remark 5.2. Although uIi was defined taking into account the starting running node xi of the
game, it turns out that the pair of strategies associated to the value of the game is independent
of the starting game position. The key point of this fact is that the inequalities in (5.4) do not
change during the game, as we describe now.
Suppose that, at the start, Player I lets Player II move the game token, so that Player I
receives a payment of amount . Then, the second turn of the game can be interpreted as a new
game which starts in the current position of the game token and the terminal nodes x0 and x3
now have associated an expected value of F0 +  and F3 + , respectively. The “update” of F0
and F3 by the respective new terminal payoffs F0 +  and F3 +  does not modify any of the
inequalities in (5.4).
Consider then the value uIi of a game starting at the running node xi, with terminal payoffs
F0 and F3 and following the optimal pair of strategies SI , SII , such that after n turns the game
token is placed at the running node xj. From the previous argument, it is derived that this
uIi is the same for a game which follows the same pair of strategies SI , SII but starts at the
running node xj and has terminal payoffs F0 + kn  and F3 + kn , for some kn ∈ N that takes
into account the update in the payoffs due to the n turns already played.
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Due to this equivalence, if the strategies associated to uIj were different from the ones in
uIi , this would mean that the strategies associated to u
I
i were not optimal, which contradicts the
choice of strategies for uIi . This argument is known as Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (see
Theorem 3.2).
We proceed analogously in the computation of uIIi for i = 1, 2, and obtain that B2 is the
associated pair of strategies whatever is the starting node of the game. Then, since uIi and u
II
i
have both the same associated pair of strategies for each i (the pair of strategies B2 in this case),
we get that uIi = u
II
i for i = 1, 2 and therefore the game has a value, already computed in (5.3).
Remark 5.3. The solution corresponding to B2, i.e., u1 =
1
3 (2F0 + F3) and u2 =
1
3 (F0 + 2F3)
according to (5.3), is the only one that satisfies the DPP (4.7) associated to the game. This is
in agreement with the uniqueness result in Theorem 4.8.
Assume now that all inequalities in (5.4) hold but (3). We proceed in the same way we did
above, when computing the value of the game provided all inequalities in (5.4) held. As before,
the game has a value, now for the associated pairs of strategies A1 and B1. However, this case
differs from the previous one on the fact that it is not enough to just look at Figure 5.2 to decide
the pairs of strategies associated to the value of the game in all running nodes (recall that the
pairs of strategies does not depend on the starting position of the game, as we already justified
in Remark 5.2).
More precisely, when all inequalities in (5.4) hold, the node B2=B6 has associated the largest
expected value of the game both in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, between all compatible pairs of strategies
for the players. But since inequality (3) of (5.4) now does not hold, some of the edges in the
two graphs are reversed. Because of that, node A=B1 is now the node with largest associated
expected value of the game, among all compatible pairs of strategies. On the other hand, node
A1=B1 is the node with largest associated expected value of the game in Figure 5.3, after
making all changes required in the edges and among all compatible pairs of strategies for the
players.
From these, it follows that the pairs of strategies Ax, for x = 2, . . . , 6, are associated to
uI1 = u
II
1 but not to the value of the game, since u
I
i = u
II
i does not hold for all i = 1, 2 (it
fails for i = 2) for any of these pairs of strategies. However, the pairs of strategies A1=B1 are
associated to both uI1 = u
II
1 (in view of Figure 5.2) and u
I
2 = u
II
2 (in view of Figure 5.3), so
that the game has a value associated to the pairs of strategies A1=B1.
Remark 5.4. The case we have just described is a clear example on how important it is to
consider the graph of strategies of all running nodes when trying to determine the pair (or pairs)
of strategies associated to the value of the game. This fact motivates the question of whether it
could be possible that the intersection set of pairs of strategies with largest expected value of the
game associated to each running node xi, is empty. The answer is negative due to the existence
and uniqueness of the value of the game, which was already treated in Section 4.2.2.
Therefore, the game will always have a value, since the existence (and uniqueness) of a
common pair of strategies with largest expected value of the game for all running game nodes,
is guaranteed by Theorem 4.8. And because of the existence of the value of the game (and
therefore the existence of an associated unique pair of strategies), it is sufficient to look at as
many different graphs of strategies of running nodes as necessary until we end up with a unique
pair of strategies.
Just to conclude the discussion of this example, the pair of strategies associated to the value
of the game are A1=B1 when the inequality (2) in (5.4) is not satisfied (and therefore inequality
(3) is also violated), and the same result is obtained when inequality (1.5) does not hold neither.
The pair of strategies is A4 when the inequality (1) is not fulfilled and also when the inequality
(0) fails (hence just inequality (-1) holds in (5.4)). This discussion is summarized in Table 5.2.
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Conditions satisfied Pair of strategies
(3), (2), (1.5), (1), (0), (-1) B2 (=B6)
(3), (2), (1.5), (1), (0), (-1) A1 (=B1)
(3),(2), (1.5), (1), (0), (-1) A1 (=B1)
(3),(2),(1.5), (1), (0), (-1) A1 (=B1)
(3),(2),(1.5),(1), (0), (-1) A4
(3),(2),(1.5),(1),(0), (-1) A4
Table 5.2: Pairs of strategies in Table 5.1 associated to the value of the game in terms of the
conditions in (5.4) that are satisfied. The strategies in brackets are not optimal.
x0 x1 x2 xn−1 xn xn+1
Figure 5.4: Game positions of the game on a segment with multiple running nodes.
Remark 5.5. The failure of inequality (0) means that F0 ≥ F3, but in practice it is sufficient
to consider F0 = F3 since the case F0 > F3 leads to the symmetric situation to the one already
analyzed.
About the pairs of strategies which involve either action 3 or 5 in x2, they are not in any
case the ones associated to the value of the game. This is reasonable since we are assuming that
the players are playing optimally, and these strategies are against the best interest for Player I.
This is so since these pairs of strategies in x2 imply that Player I chooses to play a round of
classical random Tug-of-War game, in a situation where letting Player II move would yield the
same game position plus an extra -payment, which Player I would not receive otherwise.
5.2 Game on a segment with multiple running nodes
After looking in detail into the game on a segment with two running nodes in the previous
section, it is natural to consider the generalization of the game to the case with n running nodes
(see Figure 5.4). As before, we assume F0 ≤ Fn+1.
Let us examine heuristically the choices available to both players to motivate the analysis
below. On the one hand, at any given running node, Player I has three options: to move towards
x0, towards xn+1, or let Player II decide. As in the previous section, moving towards x0 is
not reasonable, since F0 ≤ Fn+1 implies that the new game position chosen by Player I would
actually be more favorable to Player II. Note that Player I would attain the same position and
receive an -payoff by letting Player II decide next move, which will be towards x0.
On the other hand, Player II has two options: to move towards x0 or towards xn+1. In
principle, moving towards xn+1 (the terminal node with largest terminal payoff) seems against
Player’s II interest. However, there could be situations where it might be preferable for Player
II to minimize the damage and end the the game right away paying Fn+1, in order to avoid
-payments.
This heuristic reasoning yields three regions in the segment according to both player’s choices,
which can be described as follows in terms of two indices j1 < j2:
• at the nodes xi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1, Player I allows Player II to move, who moves towards the
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y0
xk
y1
xk+1
yj1−k−1
xj1−1
yj1−k
xj1
yn−k
xn+1
Figure 5.5: Game positions after relabeling the original nodes xi as yi−k, for k ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
terminal node x0;
• at the nodes xi, for j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1, Players I and II play a round of classical random
Tug-of-War game, where the players want to move towards the terminal node xn+1 and
x0, respectively;
• at the nodes xi, for j2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, Player I allows Player II to move, who moves towards
the terminal node xn+1.
In fact, as we are going to see, the expected value of the game at each game position is
completely determined by looking at the pairs of strategies SI , SII of the form just described.
These pairs of strategies SI , SII are the only reasonable ones to be adopted by the players, since
playing classical random Tug-of-War game with Players I and II wanting to move towards node
x0 and xn+1 respectively (that is, switching their roles), is not a reasonable strategy. Moreover,
playing classical random Tug-of-War game when both players want to move towards the same
terminal node, is not a reasonable situation either, in this case Player I will receive a better
payoff by allowing Player II to move.
Next we present the auxiliary results Lemma 5.6 and 5.8, necessary in the analysis of this
game, in terms of the indices j1 and j2 introduced above.
Lemma 5.6. Consider 1 ≤ j1 ≤ n and let SI , SII be any pair of strategies such that Player I
allows Player II to move at node xj1 , while Player II moves towards the terminal node x0 at all
game positions xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1. Then, the expected value of the game at xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1, is
ui = F0 + i .
Proof. We argue by strong mathematical induction. Let Pi be the property stated in the lemma
and assume it holds for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1. We aim to prove that Pj1 is also true. There are
two different possible situations in terms of Player I’s strategy at the game positions xi for
1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1.
On the one hand, suppose that Player I allows Player II to move at node xk for some
1 ≤ k ≤ j1 − 1. Then, since Pk is true by the strong induction hypothesis, the value of the game
at the game positions xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, is ui = F0 + i . According to this, we can relabel all
game nodes (see Figure 5.5) so that the original node xk is now a terminal node with associated
expected payoff Fk = F0 + k .
The expected value of the game at node yi for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1−k, is ui = Fk + i  = F0 + (k+ i) ,
since Pj1−k is true by hypothesis of the strong induction. In terms of the original game nodes,
the computed value ui is the expected value of the game at the node xi+k, ui = F0 + (k + i) ,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1 − k. In particular, when i = j1 − k we have that uj1 = F0 + j1 , so that Pj1 is
also true.
On the other hand, the other possible game situation is that Players I and II play a round of
classical random Tug-of-War game with opposite terminal nodes as their respective objectives,
in all the nodes xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1. That is, we are assuming now that Player I does not allow
Player II to move at any node xi for i < j1, on the contrary to the previous game situation
considered. In this case we can compute directly the value uj1 , which follows from the solution
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of the coupled linear system
u0 = F0;
ui =
1
2 (ui−1 + ui+1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1;
uj1 = uj1−1 + ;
in view of (5.1) and (5.2). Thus, we obtain ui = F0 + i  for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1, which gives us the result
we wanted to prove.
Remark 5.7. Due to this lemma, provided that the strategy of Player I at the node xj1 implies
letting move Player II, it does not matter if the strategy in the game positions xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1−1
involves, either the action of letting move Player II, or playing classical random Tug-of-War
game trying to move towards the terminal node xn+1 (note that these two actions are the only
reasonable ones for Player I). In other words, the expected value of the game at the node xj1 ,
provided all the necessary hypothesis in Lemma 5.6 hold, is independent of the strategy of Player
I at the game positions xi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1.
An analogous result to Lemma 5.6 is the following. Its proof follows analogously to the one
for Lemma 5.6.
Lemma 5.8. Consider 1 ≤ j2 ≤ n and let SI , SII be any pair of strategies such that Player I
allows Player II to move at node xj2 , while Player II moves towards the terminal node xn+1 at
all game positions xi for j2 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the expected value of the game at the game position
xi for j2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, is ui = Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) .
Remark 5.9. Just as it occurred with Lemma 5.6, the expected value of the game at the node
xj2 , provided all the necessary hypothesis in Lemma 5.8 hold, is independent of the strategy of
Player I at the game positions xi, for j2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that the only reasonable actions for
Player I to choose at these nodes are, either let Player II move towards the terminal node xn+1,
or play a round of classical random Tug-of-War game trying to move towards the terminal node
x0.
Remark 5.10. Our last observation concerns the “coherence” of reasonable pairs of strategies
SI , SII . That is, suppose that the player’s strategy indicates at the running node xi to move
the game token towards a terminal node, say x0, and the action at the node xi+1 is moving
towards the opposite terminal node, xn+1. Then, in all the game positions xj for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, the
aim of the player is to attain the terminal node x0, while in all the other running nodes xj for
i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the player wants to arrive to the terminal node xn+1. Note that a situation where
the action to take at xi is to move towards the terminal node x0, while the action at xi−1 is to
move towards the terminal node xn+1, cannot be part of a reasonable strategy since both actions
contradict each other.
At this point, if we want to compute the expected value of the game for each pair of strategies
SI , SII , it is enough to restrict ourselves to the reasonable strategies described above, which
simplifies remarkably the number of computations. When n = 3, for instance, the number of
pairs of strategies SI , SII to consider is reduced to 9 from a total of 72; when n = 4, just 13
strategies out of 432 have to be taken into account; etc. As one would expect, this reasoning
also works in our previous example of the game on a segment with two running nodes: the only
reasonable pairs of strategies SI , SII are A1, A2, A4, B2, B4, from the total of 12 appearing in
Table 5.1.
With the previous considerations, the computation of the expected value of the game
associated to each pair of strategies SI , SII and the existence of a game value, follow in the same
way as in the game on a segment with two running nodes. Just to mention that the equivalent
computation to (5.1) and (5.2) for the case of n running nodes, in terms of the indices j1 of
Lemma 5.6 and j2 of Lemma 5.8, is
ui = F0 + i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ j1; (5.7)
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ui =
n+ 1− i
n+ 1
(F0 + j1 ) +
i
n+ 1
[Fn+1 + (n+ 1− j2) ], for j1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j2 − 1; (5.8)
ui = Fn+1 + (n+ 1− i) , for j2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1. (5.9)
The comparison of the expected values of the game we have just computed, gives us the
relation
F0 +
(
j2 + 1− n+ 1
j1 + 1
)
 < Fn+1 (5.10)
when comparing (5.7) and (5.8), the relation
F0 +
(
j1 − (n+ 1) + (j2 − 1)(n+ 1− j2)
n+ 2− j2
)
 < Fn+1 (5.11)
by comparing (5.8) and (5.9), and finally
Fn+1 < F0 + [2j1 − (n+ 1)]  (5.12)
when taking into account (5.7) and (5.9).
Concerning these inequalities, (5.10) holds while a round of classical random Tug-of-War
game at the running node xj1+1 (where Players I and II want to move towards the terminal
node xn+1 and x0, respectively) yields a larger expected value of the game at this node, than
letting Player II move the game token (where both players aim towards the terminal node x0).
Similarly, condition (5.11) holds while a round of classical random Tug-of-War game at the
running node xj2−1 (where Players I and II want to move towards the terminal node xn+1 and
x0, respectively), has associated a smaller expected value of the game at this node than letting
Player II move the game token towards the terminal node xn+1 (both players aim to attain
the terminal node xn+1). Finally, (5.12) is satisfied when the expected value of the game at
the running node xj1 is larger in the situation that both players aim to reach the terminal
node xn+1, than keep moving towards x0 as their strategies indicate in all running nodes xi for
1 ≤ i ≤ j1 − 1 (since both players always want to reach the same terminal node, Player I always
allows Player II to move).
The relations (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) are the equivalent version for the multiple running
node case of (5.4) when n = 2. Thus, one has now all the necessary results to determine the pair
of strategies SI , SII which brings associated the value of the game for any given initial data: n,
F0, Fn+1 and  > 0. We insist on the fact that the value of the game exists (and is unique),
according to Section 4.2.2.
5.3 Y-game with two running nodes
This game is a slightly modified version of the game on a segment with two running nodes. The
only difference is that now there are not two terminal nodes but three, so that the game position
x2 is adjacent to three different nodes (Figure 5.6). We will assume F0 ≤ F3 ≤ F4. Since the
game is played following the same rules of the game on a segment, all possible pairs of strategies
are the ones considered in Table 5.3. Note that Sx3I (x2) does not appear since it makes no sense
because Sx4I (x2) is at least as good if not better.
The computation of the expected value of the game at each running node for each pair of
strategies, is done in the same manner as in the game on a segment. The results obtained are
the following:
A1 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 2
A2 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 =
1
2 (F0 + F4 + )
A3 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 
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x4
x3
x1 x2x0
Figure 5.6: Game positions of the Y-game with two running nodes.
S∗I (x1) S
x2
I (x1)
Sx0II (x1) A B
S∗I (x2) S
x4
I (x2) S
x1
I (x2)
Sx1II (x2) 1 2 3
Sx3II (x2) 4 5 6
Table 5.3: Table of all possible pairs of strategies for the Y-game with two running nodes.
A4 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F3 + 
A5 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 =
1
2 (F3 + F4)
A6 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 =
1
2 (F0 + F3 + )
B1 :
{
u1 = F0 + 
u2 = F0 + 2
B2 :
{
u1 =
1
3 (2F0 + F4)
u2 =
1
3 (F0 + 2F4)
B3 :
{
u1 = F0
u2 = F0
(5.13)
B4 :
{
u1 =
1
2 (F0 + F3 + )
u2 = F3 + 
B5 :
{
u1 =
1
2
(
F0 +
F3
2 +
F4
2
)
u2 =
1
2 (F3 + F4)
B6 :
{
u1 =
1
3 (2F0 + F3)
u2 =
1
3 (F0 + 2F3)
By comparing all the expected values of the game obtained separately for u1 and u2, we
can order the pairs of strategies from smallest associated expected value of the game to largest.
The comparison of u1 leads us to the graph of Figure 5.7, and Figure 5.8 is associated to the
comparison of u2. The conditions that arise when comparing the values u1 and u2 respectively,
and which must hold so that the directed edges in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 are correct as displayed,
are (5.14). The left-hand side inequalities in (5.14) already appeared in (5.4) for the example on
a segment, while the inequalities on the right come from adding the extra terminal node, x4, to
the game on a segment.

(−1) :  > 0,
(0) : F0 < F4,
(1) : F0 +  < F4,
(2) : F0 + 2 < F4,
(3) : F0 + 3 < F4,
+

(0′) : F0 < F3,
(0′′) : F3 < F4,
(1′) : F0 +  < F3,
(2′′) : F4 < F3 + 2,
(3′) : F0 + 3 < F3,
(α) : F0 + F4 < 2F3 + ,
(β) : 2F0 + F4 < 3F3,
(10) : F0 + 3F4 + 3 < 4F3,
(11) : F0 + 3F3 + 3 < 4F4.
(5.14)
Since the same arguments used in the game on a segment apply here, the game always has a
value and is independent of the node where the game starts. Note that this results are valid not
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A=B1
B2
B6
B4
B5
(3’)
(3) (-
1)
(0”)
(α+2’
)
(0”)
(2”)
(β)
(1’)
(1’+3)
Figure 5.7: Directed graph where the nodes are the pairs of strategies described in Table 5.3
and computed in (5.13), and edges point towards the largest expected value of the game at the
x1-node. The letter A stands for all possible combinations Ax, x = 1, . . . , 6.
A1=B1
A6
A2
B6
B2
A5=B5
A4=B4
(0”)
(-1)
(1’
)
(α)
(1’+
3)
(3”)
(β
)(3”
)
(3)
(0”)
(3’)
(0”)
(-1)
(-1)
(11)
(3)
(1
0)
(α+2”)
(2”)
(3)
(1’)
Figure 5.8: Directed graph where the nodes are the pairs of strategies described in Table 5.3
and computed in (5.13), and edges point towards the largest expected value of the game at the
x2-node.
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xk+1 xn xn+1
xk′+1 xn′ xn′+1
xkxk−1x1x0
Figure 5.9: Game positions of the Y-game with multiple running nodes.
just for the graphs in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, but for any modified version of them, arising when
any of the inequalities in (5.14) is not satisfied.
To finish the analysis of this game, we point out that strategies 2 and 6 at the game position
x2 bring associated the same issues we already commented in the game on a segment with two
running nodes. That is, although any pair of strategies involving strategy 2 or 6 gives the same
expected value of the game after a formal computation, strategy 6 is not reasonable from a point
of view of players who play optimally. Another strategy at node x2 which is not reasonable
either is 3, something which was also discussed in the segment version of this game with two
running nodes.
5.4 Y-game with multiple running nodes
The generalization of the Y -game with two running nodes to the case with multiple running
nodes (Figure 5.9) can, in fact, be reduced to the game on a segment with multiple running
nodes. The key observation is that at the node where all three sub-branches meet, which we
will refer to as the Y -point, either player is going to choose to move towards one and only one
of the terminal nodes x0, xn+1, xn′+1. Then, once the pairs of strategies SI , SII for the players
are fixed, the game is played, in practice, in a segment.
In other words, we just take into account the two sub-branches involved in the actions at
the Y -point and solve a game on a segment with multiple running nodes, which results from
restricting the game to this two particular sub-branches. More precisely, we are looking at a new
graph which results from avoiding the sub-branch not considered in the action of the players
at the Y -point in the original Y -game with multiple running nodes. As a result, we obtain
the expected value of the game for all game positions in the two sub-branches considered, in
particular in the Y -point.
The expected value of the game at the Y -point, say uY , depends on the expected value of
the game at the terminal nodes of the two previous sub-branches and can be computed using
only these two. Now uY , once computed, can be interpreted as the terminal node of a game
on a segment with multiple running nodes, constituted by this node and the sub-branch not
considered before. Hence, we are dealing again with a game on a segment with multiple running
nodes. Solving it, the expected value of the game for all game positions of the original Y -game
with multiple running nodes is determined.

Chapter 6
A PDE for the continuous game
value of the Totalitarian
Tug-of-War
As we mentioned in Section 3.4, the DPP of the classical random Tug-of-War game can be
seen as a discretization of the infinity Laplacian, which emerges in the limit as  → 0 of this
DPP. Then, it is natural to ask whether this is the case for the DPP (4.10) associated to the
Totalitarian Tug-of-War. It turns out that (4.10) can be seen as a discretization of the fully
nonlinear second-order degenerate partial differential equation
min
{|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0 for x ∈ Ω. (6.1)
Note that due to the lack of regularity of u (recall that viscosity solutions are merely
continuous according to Definition 1.3), we cannot expect that equation (6.1) holds in the
classical sense. This motivates us to work in the framework of viscosity solutions, reviewed in
Chapter 1.
The main result of this chapter is the derivation of (6.1) from (4.10), the DPP associated to
the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War, and is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Let u be the solution of the Dirichlet problem (4.12) and F the same boundary
function in (4.12) but restricted to ∂Ω. Then, u = lim→0 u uniformly in Ω is the unique
viscosity solution to the Dirichlet problem{
min
{|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆N∞u(x)} = 0, x ∈ Ω;
u(x) = F (x), x ∈ ∂Ω.
(6.2)
Remark 6.2. The gradient of a solution u to (6.2) has to be, at least formally, non-vanishing
in Ω, since |∇u(x)| ≥ 1 in the viscosity sense for all x ∈ Ω according to (6.1). This implies that
we just have to consider (in the viscosity sense) the normalized ∞-Laplace operator as defined
in (2.11) when ∇u(x) 6= 0.
The following comparison principle is necessary for the proof of Theorem 6.1, and is a
particular case of the results in [16, Section 4]. Just to mention that for our convenience, from
now on we will write (6.1) as
G[u](x) = min
{|∇u(x)| − 1,−∆N∞u(x)} . (6.3)
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Theorem 6.3 (Comparison Principle). Let the functions u, v : Ω→ R be respectively a viscosity
subsolution and viscosity supersolution of (6.1), i.e., G[u] ≤ 0 ≤ G[v] in Ω. Assume also that v
is bounded from above in Ω and u ≤ v on ∂Ω. Then u ≤ v in Ω.
A result which follows easily from the comparison principle is the following bound for solutions
of (6.2), which highlights the requirement for the viscosity supersolution of being bounded from
above in Theorem 6.3. This assumption is required in Theorem 6.3 so that the auxiliary Lemma
6.10 below holds.
Proposition 6.4. Let u be a viscosity solution to the Dirichlet problem (6.2) and F : ∂Ω→ R
bounded. Then, for all x ∈ Ω and K = ‖F‖∞,∂Ω,
dist(x, ∂Ω)−K ≤ u(x) ≤ dist(x, ∂Ω) +K. (6.4)
Proof. Consider, for F (x) the same in (6.2), the Dirichlet problem{
min
{|∇v(x)| − 1,−∆N∞v(x)} = 0, x ∈ Ω;
v(x) = K, x ∈ ∂Ω, (6.5)
the unique viscosity solution of which is proved to be v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) +K (see [16, Lemma
6.10]), a viscosity supersolution of (6.2). Moreover, it is continuous and bounded in Ω. Then, by
Theorem 6.3 it follows that u ≤ v in Ω and therefore the upper bound for u is proved.
About the lower bound of u, consider now the Dirichlet problem{
min
{|∇v(x)| − 1,−∆N∞v(x)} = 0, x ∈ Ω;
v(x) = −K, x ∈ ∂Ω,
the solution of which is v(x) = dist(x, ∂Ω) − K, a viscosity subsolution of (6.2). On the
other hand, since u is a viscosity solution to (6.2) by hypothesis, it is in particular a viscosity
supersolution and bounded from above due to the first part of the proof. Then, by Theorem 6.3
it follows that v ≤ u in Ω and the proof is finished.
Another consequence of Theorem 6.3 is the uniqueness of solution to (6.2), which is the
result that we really need in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Corollary 6.5 (Uniqueness). The Dirichlet problem (6.2) has a unique viscosity solution.
Proof. Let u1 and u2 be two viscosity solutions of (6.2). In particular, they are both a viscosity
subsolution and viscosity supersolution of (6.1) in Ω and bounded from above and below in
Ω, according to Proposition 6.4. Thus, taking u = u1 and v = u2, by Theorem 6.3 we obtain
u1 ≤ u2 in Ω. On the other hand, if we now take u = u2 and v = u1, again by Theorem 6.3 we
get u2 ≤ u1 in Ω and therefore u1 = u2 in Ω, that is, there is a unique viscosity solution to the
Dirichlet problem (6.2).
Since we are working in the framework of viscosity solutions, we include by convenience the
definition of viscosity solution for equation (6.1), i.e., G[u] = 0 in Ω according to (6.3).
Definition 6.6. A viscosity subsolution of the equation G[u] = 0 in Ω is an upper semicontinuous
function u : Ω→ R such that
min
{
|∇ϕ(xˆ)| − 1,−
〈
D2ϕ(xˆ)
∇ϕ(xˆ)
|∇ϕ(xˆ)| ,
∇ϕ(xˆ)
|∇ϕ(xˆ)|
〉}
≤ 0, (6.6)
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and u(x) ≤ ϕ(x), for all x in a
neighborhood of xˆ (in other words, ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ, or
equivalently, u− ϕ has a local maximum at xˆ).
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Similarly, a viscosity supersolution of G[u] = 0 in Ω is a lower semicontinuous function
u : Ω→ R such that
min
{
|∇ϕ(xˆ)| − 1,−
〈
D2ϕ(xˆ)
∇ϕ(xˆ)
|∇ϕ(xˆ)| ,
∇ϕ(xˆ)
|∇ϕ(xˆ)|
〉}
≥ 0, (6.7)
whenever xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) are such that u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and u(x) ≥ ϕ(x), for all x in a
neighborhood of xˆ (in other words, ϕ touches u at xˆ from below in a neighborhood of xˆ, or
equivalently, u− ϕ has a local minimum at xˆ).
Finally, a function u : Ω→ R is a viscosity solution of G[u] = 0 in Ω if it is both a viscosity
subsolution and viscosity supersolution of G[u] = 0 in Ω.
6.1 The limit PDE
In order to prove Theorem 6.1 we start showing that u is the uniform limit of u in Ω as → 0
and a viscosity solution to (6.2). Later, in Section 6.2, we will focus on proving the uniqueness
of this u, that is, prove Theorem 6.3 so that Corollary 6.5 follows.
The following lemma, which relies on uniform convergence, provides us with the precise result
for a rigorous proof of Theorem 6.1. We point out that this lemma is proved in [18, Lemma 4.5]
for continuous functions, but this version does not apply in our case since u is not continuous
in general.
Lemma 6.7. Let u = lim→0 u uniformly in Ω ⊂ Rn, xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that
u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ) and u(x) < ϕ(x) for all x in a neighborhood U of xˆ, when x 6= xˆ (in other words, ϕ
touches u at xˆ strictly from above in U , or equivalently, u− ϕ has a strict maximum at xˆ in U).
Then, for any given η > 0 there exists a sequence of points (x) ⊂ U satisfying xˆ = lim→0 x
such that
u(x)− ϕ(x) ≤ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η for all x ∈ U . (6.8)
Proof. Writing u − ϕ = (u − u) + (u− ϕ), for a fixed ball Br(xˆ) we have that
sup
U\Br(xˆ)
(u − ϕ) = sup
U\Br(xˆ)
{(u − u) + (u− ϕ)}
≤ sup
U\Br(xˆ)
(u − u) + sup
U\Br(xˆ)
(u− ϕ) (6.9)
≤ 2 sup
U\Br(xˆ)
(u− ϕ),
where the last inequality holds for  small enough, since u = lim→0 u uniformly in Ω by
hypothesis. Note also that u is bounded in Ω according to Proposition 6.4 and then it follows
that supU\Br(xˆ)(u− ϕ) is finite.
Moreover, for  small enough (say  < r),
sup
U\Br(xˆ)
(u − ϕ) < u(xˆ)− ϕ(xˆ).
This is so because when → 0, on the one hand, the right-hand side approaches zero since u → u
and u(xˆ) = ϕ(xˆ). But on the other hand, the left-hand side has a strictly negative limit according
to (6.9) and because ϕ touches u at xˆ strictly from above in U , so that supU\Br(xˆ)(u− ϕ) < 0.
Therefore, there is a point x ∈ Br(xˆ) such that, when  < r,
u(x)− ϕ(x) ≤ sup
U
(u − ϕ) ≤ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η for all x ∈ U .
The proof finishes by letting r → 0 via a sequence, say r = 1, 12 , 13 , . . . . Hence there is a sequence
of points x → xˆ which satisfy (6.8), as we wanted to prove.
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Remark 6.8. Under the same hypothesis of Lemma 6.7 but for φ ∈ C2(Ω) touching u at xˆ
strictly from below in U , it is derived for any given η > 0 the existence of a sequence of points
(x) ⊂ U satisfying xˆ = lim→0 x, such that
u(x)− φ(x) ≥ u(x)− φ(x)− η for all x ∈ U . (6.10)
The proof of this last result follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 6.7.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. In order to prove that u converges uniformly to u in Ω as  → 0, we
invoke [3, Theorem 2.1], which provides uniform convergence in Ω. For our particular problem,
the hypothesis required by this theorem are a comparison principle for equation (6.1), given
by Theorem 6.3, and the following assumptions on the approximation scheme G[u], defined in
(4.11) and that follows from the DPP for the -Totalitarian Tug-of-War game:
i) Monotonicity, i.e., G[u](x) ≤ G[v](x) whenever u ≥ v and u(x) = v(x). This is so, as
we already argued in Remark 4.14.
ii) Stability, which means that solutions u of the Dirichlet problem (4.12) are bounded
independently of  (at least for  small enough, since we are interested in the case → 0).
It follows from Remark 4.12.
iii) Consistency, i.e., lim→0 G[ϕ](x) = G[ϕ](xˆ) for lim→0 x = xˆ, where G[ϕ] is defined in
(6.3). For the proof of this fact, we consider the slightly modified approximation scheme
min
{
1

(
ϕ(x)− inf
y∈B(x)
ϕ(y)− 
)
,
1
2
(
2ϕ(x)− sup
y∈B(x)
ϕ(y)− inf
y∈B(x)
ϕ(y)
)}
.
Note that the homogeneous equation associated to this new approximation scheme is
equivalent to G[ϕ](x) = 0, so that the result of [3, Theorem 2.1] still holds for the problem
associated to u, G[u] = 0 in Ω.
At this point, the consistency follows with a similar argument to the one below, when
proving that u is a viscosity solution to G[u](xˆ) = 0, so we skip it here.
In fact, the conditions above are required to be satisfied not just by the approximation
scheme G[u], but the Dirichlet problem (4.12). It is the case, since u(x) = F (x) for all x ∈ Γ
and u(x) = F (x) for all x ∈ ∂Ω. Then, we can apply [3, Theorem 2.1] and conclude that
u = lim→0 u uniformly in Ω.
It remains to check that u is a viscosity solution to (6.1). Recall that according to Definition
6.6, the fact that u is a viscosity solution is equivalent to be both a viscosity subsolution and
viscosity supersolution, which is the way we proceed for its proof.
According to (4.10), either
u(x)− inf
B(x)
u −  = 0 or u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
B(x)
u + inf
B(x)
u
)
= 0 (6.11)
or both, so that we have to check that u is a viscosity subsolution and viscosity supersolution in
all three possible situations.
For the proof that u is a viscosity subsolution, consider a point xˆ ∈ Ω and a test function
ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) such that ϕ touches u at xˆ from above in a neighborhood of xˆ. Without loss of
generality (see Remark 1.4) we can ask instead that ϕ touches u at xˆ strictly from above in a
neighborhood of xˆ. Then Lemma 6.7 holds and rearranging terms in (6.8) we have that
inf
B(x)
u ≤ inf
B(x)
{ϕ+ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η}
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= inf
B(x)
ϕ+ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η
= min
B(x)
ϕ+ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η
and then
inf
B(x)
u − min
B(x)
ϕ ≤ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η. (6.12)
From this it is clear that
ϕ(x)− min
B(x)
ϕ− η ≤ u(x)− inf
B(x)
u
and if we assume that u(x)− infB(x) u−  = 0, i.e., the first equation in (6.11) holds, it follows
that
ϕ(x)− min
B(x)
ϕ− − η ≤ u(x)− inf
B(x)
u −  = 0, (6.13)
which can be equivalently written for  > 0 as
1

(
ϕ(x)− min
B(x)
ϕ
)
− 1− η ≤ 0. (6.14)
At this point it is necessary to recall that the gradient of a solution to (6.1) has to be, at least
formally, non-vanishing, as we already noted in Remark 6.2. Because of this, we can assume
|∇ϕ(xˆ)| ≥ 1 since we are done otherwise. It follows that ∇ϕ(xˆ) 6= 0 and since ϕ is in particular
continuous and lim→0 x = xˆ by Lemma 6.7, we also have that ∇ϕ(x) 6= 0 for  small enough.
On the other hand, let xmin ∈ Ω be such that ϕ(xmin ) = minB(x) ϕ. In particular xmin ∈
∂B(x), otherwise suppose to the contrary that there exists a subsequence x
min
k
∈ Bk(xk) of
minimum points of ϕ in Ω. Then ∇ϕ(xmink ) = 0 and since limk→0 xmink = xˆ, the continuity of
ϕ implies that ∇ϕ(xˆ) = 0, which is a contradiction with our previous discussion.
According to this,
xmin = x − 
[ ∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)| + o(1)
]
as → 0, (6.15)
which can be deduced from the fact that, for  small enough, ϕ is approximately the same as its
tangent plane. More precisely, consider xmin = x −  v for |v| = 1, and ω any fixed direction
with |ω| = 1. Since ϕ(xmin ) ≤ ϕ(x −  ω), the Taylor expansion of ϕ(xmin ) at x up to first
order terms gives us
ϕ(x)− 〈∇ϕ(x),  v〉+ o() = ϕ(xmin ) ≤ ϕ(x −  ω) as → 0
and after some manipulation,
〈∇ϕ(x), v〉+ o(1) ≥ ϕ(x −  ω)− ϕ(x)

= 〈∇ϕ(x), ω〉+ o(1) as → 0.
Since the previous argument holds for any direction ω, we can conclude that
v =
∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)| + o(1) as → 0.
Now that expression (6.15) of xmin has been properly justified, we evaluate the Taylor
expansion of ϕ around xmin at x, i.e.,
min
B(x)
ϕ = ϕ(xmin ) = ϕ
(
x − 
[ ∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)| + o(1)
])
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= ϕ(x)−
〈
∇ϕ(x),  ∇ϕ(x)|∇ϕ(x)|
〉
+ o()
= ϕ(x)−  |∇ϕ(x)|+ o() as → 0,
which after rearranging terms and dividing by , is equivalent to write
1

(
ϕ(x)− min
B(x)
ϕ
)
= |∇ϕ(x)| − o(1) as → 0.
In combination with (6.14) we obtain the estimate
|∇ϕ(x)| − 1 ≤ o(1) as → 0,
and taking → 0 one finally gets |∇ϕ(xˆ)| − 1 ≤ 0, as required according to (6.6).
Let us assume now that u(x)− 12
(
supB(x) u + infB(x) u
)
= 0, i.e., the second equation in
(6.11) holds. Consider the point xmax ∈ Ω such that ϕ(xmax ) = maxB(x) ϕ and its symmetric
point in B(x), given by
x˜max = x − (xmax − x) .
The evaluation of the Taylor expansion of ϕ up to second order terms around these two points
at x is, respectively,
ϕ (xmax ) = ϕ(x) + 〈∇ϕ(x), (xmax − x)〉
+
1
2
〈
D2ϕ(x) (x
max
 − x), (xmax − x)
〉
+ o
(
2
)
as → 0
and
ϕ (x˜max ) = ϕ(x)− 〈∇ϕ(x), (xmax − x)〉
+
1
2
〈
D2ϕ(x) (x
max
 − x), (xmax − x)
〉
+ o
(
2
)
as → 0.
Adding both expressions we obtain
ϕ (xmax )+ϕ (x˜
max
 )−2ϕ(x) =
〈
D2ϕ(x) (x
max
 − x), (xmax − x)
〉
+o
(
2
)
as → 0. (6.16)
Furthermore, by our choice of xmax and x˜
max
 , it holds
ϕ (xmax ) + ϕ (x˜
max
 )− 2ϕ(x) ≥ max
B(x)
ϕ+ min
B(x)
ϕ− 2ϕ(x). (6.17)
On the other hand, from (6.8) we deduce that
sup
B(x)
u − max
B(x)
ϕ ≤ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η
and
inf
B(x)
u − min
B(x)
ϕ ≤ u(x)− ϕ(x) + η.
The second of these two expressions is exactly (6.12), which was derived above. The first
expression follows in a similar way. Adding these two inequalities, rearranging terms and
multiplying by 12 , we obtain
ϕ(x)− 1
2
(
max
B(x)
ϕ+ min
B(x)
ϕ
)
− η ≤ u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
B(x)
u + inf
B(x)
u
)
.
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And because we are assuming that u(x) − 12
(
supB(x) u + infB(x) u
)
= 0, i.e., the second
equation in (6.11) holds, it follows that
ϕ(x)− 1
2
(
max
B(x)
ϕ+ min
B(x)
ϕ
)
≤ η.
The combination of this last inequality with (6.16) and (6.17) gives us for η = o
(
2
)
− 〈D2ϕ(x) (xmax − x), (xmax − x)〉 ≤ o (2) as → 0,
which is more suitable to write as
− 2
〈
D2ϕ(x)
xmax − x

,
xmax − x

〉
≤ o (2) as → 0. (6.18)
The reason for that is detailed next. In the same way we deduced (6.15), it is derived that the
point xmax ∈ Ω such that ϕ(xmax ) = maxB(x) ϕ can be expressed as
xmax = x + 
[ ∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)| + o(1)
]
as → 0. (6.19)
Hence, due to (6.19), (6.18) is equivalent to
−2
〈
D2ϕ(x)
∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)| ,
∇ϕ(x)
|∇ϕ(x)|
〉
≤ o (2) as → 0,
which according to the definition of the normalized infinity Laplacian in (2.11), is the same as
writing
−2∆N∞ϕ(x) ≤ o
(
2
)
as → 0.
After dividing by 2 and taking → 0 we get −∆N∞ϕ(xˆ) ≤ 0, as required according to (6.6).
When both equations in (6.11) hold, the proof that u is a viscosity subsolution, i.e., that
condition (6.6) is satisfied, is clear by taking into account the entire argument for viscosity
subsolutions developed above. This finishes the proof that u is a viscosity subsolution to the
Dirichlet problem (6.2).
In order to prove that u is a viscosity supersolution to (6.2), we proceed analogously to the
case of viscosity subsolution. We consider now the point xˆ ∈ Ω and the test function φ ∈ C2(Ω)
such that φ touches u at xˆ strictly from below in a neighborhood of xˆ.
When assuming that the first equation in (6.11) holds, we get
φ(x)− min
B(x)
φ− + η ≥ u(x)− inf
B(x)
u −  = 0,
which is just the viscosity supersolution version of (6.13). From this it is derived as before that
|∇φ(xˆ)| − 1 ≥ 0,
so that (6.7) is satisfied.
Now, let the second equation in (6.11) hold. Consider the point xmin ∈ Ω be such that
φ(xmin ) = minB(x) φ and its symmetric point in B(x), say x˜
min
 . By adding the evaluation
around these two points at x of the Taylor expansion of φ up to second order terms, we get
φ(xmin ) + φ(x˜
min
 )− 2φ(x) =
〈
D2φ(x) (x
min
 − x),
(
xmin − x
)〉
+ o(2) as → 0. (6.20)
Furthermore, by our choice of xmin and x˜
min
 , it holds
φ(xmin ) + φ(x˜
min
 )− 2φ(x) ≤ max
B(x)
φ+ min
B(x)
φ− 2φ(x). (6.21)
62 6. A PDE for the continuous game value of the Totalitarian ToW
On the other hand, from (6.10) we deduce (in the same way as we already did in the
subsolution case) that
sup
B(x)
u − max
B(x)
φ ≥ u(x)− φ(x)− η
and
inf
B(x)
u − min
B(x)
φ ≥ u(x)− φ(x)− η.
Adding these two inequalities, rearranging terms and multiplying by 12 , we obtain
φ(x)− 1
2
(
max
B(x)
φ+ min
B(x)
φ
)
+ η ≥ u(x)− 1
2
(
sup
B(x)
u + inf
B(x)
u
)
and because we are under the assumption that the second equation in (6.11) is satisfied, it
follows that
φ(x)− 1
2
(
max
B(x)
φ+ min
B(x)
φ
)
≥ −η.
The combination of this last inequality with (6.20) and (6.21) gives us
−2
〈
D2φ(x)
xmin − x

,
xmin − x

〉
≥ o(2) as → 0,
which in view of (6.15) can be written as
−2
〈
D2φ(x)
∇φ(x)
|∇φ(x)| ,
∇φ(x)
|∇φ(x)|
〉
≥ o(2) as → 0.
After dividing by 2 and taking → 0 it is derived that −∆N∞φ(xˆ) ≥ 0, as required according to
(6.7).
When both equalities in (6.11) hold, the proof that u is a viscosity supersolution, i.e., that
condition (6.7) is satisfied, is clear by taking into account the entire argument for viscosity
supersolutions developed above. This finishes the proof that u is a viscosity supersolution to
(6.2) and then the proof of u being a viscosity solution to (6.2) is also complete.
6.2 Comparison and uniqueness for the limit equation
In order to motivate the arguments that will appear in the proof of Theorem 6.3, let u and
v be respectively a subsolution and supersolution of the equation G = 0 in Ω. Assume that
both functions are twice differentiable everywhere and u − v has a local maximum at xˆ, so
that ∇u(xˆ) = ∇v(xˆ) and D2u(xˆ) ≤ D2v(xˆ). Then, since equation (6.1) satisfies monotonicity
condition (1.3), we have that
G(xˆ, u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)) ≤ 0 ≤ G(xˆ, v(xˆ),∇v(xˆ), D2v(xˆ))
≤ G(xˆ, v(xˆ),∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)). (6.22)
In the event that G(x, r, p,X) is strictly non-decreasing in r (a simple but illustrative case),
suppose that u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) > 0. According to this,
G(xˆ, v(xˆ),∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)) < G(xˆ, u(xˆ),∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)),
which is a contradiction in view of (6.22). It then follows that u− v is non-positive at an interior
maximum. Provided that u ≤ v on ∂Ω, one can conclude that u ≤ v in Ω.
We seek to extend this argument to the case u upper semicontinuous in Ω and v lower semi-
continuous in Ω. Note that we are unable to simply plug (∇u(xˆ), D2u(xˆ)) and (∇v(xˆ), D2v(xˆ))
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into G since these expressions must be replaced by the set-valued functions J2,+Ω u(xˆ) and
J2,−Ω v(xˆ), the values of which might be empty at many points, including maximum points of
u(x) − v(x) in Ω. Then, in order to use J2,+Ω u(xˆ) and J2,−Ω v(xˆ), we employ a method that
doubles the number of variables and then penalizes this doubling. More precisely, instead of
maximizing u(x)− v(x), we maximize the function u(x)− v(y)− τ/2|x− y|2 over Ω× Ω, for
τ > 0 a parameter. As τ →∞, we closely approximate maximizing u(x)− v(x) over Ω.
In view of the use of the set-valued functions J2,+Ω u(xˆ) and J
2,−
Ω v(xˆ), it is derived that the
framework of viscosity solutions is the natural one for our current analysis. According to this,
one has to work in terms of Definition 6.6. We also include now the particular case of Lemma
1.8 formulated in terms of (6.1), which provides an equivalent definition to Definition 6.6 (as it
was already proved for the general result, Lemma 1.8).
Lemma 6.9. A function u : Ω→ R is a viscosity subsolution of (6.1) in Ω if and only if u is
upper semicontinuous and
min
{
|p| − 1,−
〈
X
p
|p| ,
p
|p|
〉}
≤ 0, for all xˆ ∈ Ω and all (p,X) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xˆ), p 6= 0.
Similarly, a function u : Ω → R is a viscosity supersolution of (6.1) in Ω if and only if u is
lower semicontinuous and
min
{
|p| − 1,−
〈
X
p
|p| ,
p
|p|
〉}
≥ 0, for all xˆ ∈ Ω and all (p,X) ∈ J2,−Ω u(xˆ), p 6= 0.
The proof of Theorem 6.3 (inspired in [7, Section 3] and [16, Section 4]) is presented now.
We start with a lemma which is crucial for the proof of the theorem (it plays the analogous role
of Lemma 4.13 for the proof of Theorem 4.10).
Lemma 6.10. Let v : Ω→ R be a viscosity supersolution of (6.1) and bounded from above in
Ω. Then, for every γ > 0 there exists a viscosity supersolution v˜ : Ω→ R of the equation
min{|∇v˜(x)| − 1,−∆N∞v˜(x)} = µ (6.23)
for some constant µ = µ(γ, v) > 0. Moreover, v˜ − v ≤ γ in Ω and v˜ − v ≥ −γ on ∂Ω.
Proof. Since v is bounded from above, v ≤ C for some constant C > 0. We look for a function
v˜ in the form v˜ = g(v), where g : (−∞, C]→ R is a smooth and increasing function such that
g−1 is also smooth. Let xˆ ∈ Ω and ϕ˜ ∈ C2(Ω) be such that ϕ˜ touches v˜ at xˆ from below in
a neighborhood of xˆ. It then follows that ϕ = g−1(ϕ˜) ∈ C2(Ω) touches v from below at xˆ in
a neighborhood of xˆ. According to this and since v is a viscosity supersolution of (6.1) by
hypothesis, in view of (6.7) we have that
min{|∇ϕ(xˆ)| − 1,−∆N∞ϕ(xˆ)} ≥ 0. (6.24)
This gives us the two next estimates. On the one hand,
|∇ϕ˜(xˆ)| = |g′(ϕ(xˆ))||∇ϕ(xˆ)| = g′(ϕ(xˆ)) |∇ϕ(xˆ)| ≥ g′(ϕ(xˆ)) (6.25)
since g is increasing and |∇ϕ(xˆ)| ≥ 1 by (6.24). On the other hand,
−∆N∞ϕ˜(xˆ) = −
〈
D2ϕ˜(xˆ)
∇ϕ˜(xˆ)
|∇ϕ˜(xˆ)| ,
∇ϕ˜(xˆ)
|∇ϕ˜(xˆ)|
〉
= −
〈
g′′(ϕ(xˆ)) (∇ϕ(xˆ)⊗∇ϕ(xˆ)) g
′(ϕ(xˆ))∇ϕ(xˆ)
|g′(ϕ(xˆ))||∇ϕ(xˆ)| ,
g′(ϕ(xˆ))∇ϕ(xˆ)
|g′(ϕ(xˆ))||∇ϕ(xˆ)|
〉
−
〈
g′(ϕ(xˆ))D2ϕ(xˆ)
g′(ϕ(xˆ))∇ϕ(xˆ)
|g′(ϕ(xˆ))||∇ϕ(xˆ)| ,
g′(ϕ(xˆ))∇ϕ(xˆ)
|g′(ϕ(xˆ))||∇ϕ(xˆ)|
〉
64 6. A PDE for the continuous game value of the Totalitarian ToW
= −g′′(ϕ(xˆ)) |∇ϕ(xˆ)|2 − g′(ϕ(xˆ)) ∆N∞ϕ(xˆ). (6.26)
We now consider, for ε > 0 (the constant γ in the statement will be chosen later as a function
of ε) and α ≤ C,
g(α) = (1 + ε)α− ε
4C
α2.
In particular, g′(α) ≥ 1 + ε/2 for α ≤ C and g′′(α) = −ε/(2C). Using this in the previous
estimates (6.25) and (6.26), one gets that
|∇ϕ˜(xˆ)| ≥ g′(ϕ(xˆ)) ≥ 1 + ε
2
, (6.27)
and taking also into account the estimates |∇ϕ(xˆ)| ≥ 1 and −∆∞ϕ(xˆ) ≥ 0 from (6.24), it holds
−∆N∞ϕ˜(xˆ) = −g′′(ϕ(xˆ)) |∇ϕ(xˆ)|2 − g′(ϕ(xˆ)) ∆N∞ϕ(xˆ)
≥ −g′′(ϕ(xˆ)) |∇ϕ(xˆ)|2 (6.28)
≥ ε
2C
.
Finally, the combination of (6.27) and (6.28) leads us to
min
{|∇ϕ˜(xˆ)| − 1,−∆N∞ϕ˜(xˆ)} ≥ min{ε2 , ε2C} = ε2 min
{
1,
1
C
}
= µ > 0,
as we wanted to prove.
About the second part of the lemma, since g(α) − α ≤ 34 εC for α ≤ C and because
v˜ = g(v), it follows that v˜ − v ≤ 34 εC in Ω. Similarly, since g(α) − α ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
for
α ≥ −D = − |min∂Ω v|, it follows that v˜− v ≥ −εD
(
1 + D4C
)
on ∂Ω. The results hold for every
γ = εmax
{
3
4
C, D
(
1 +
D
4C
)}
> 0,
provided ε is small enough.
The following lemma is also an auxiliary result in the proof of Theorem 6.3 and formalizes
the ideas commented before on how to proceed with the proof of the comparison principle.
Lemma 6.11 (Ishii’s Lemma). Let the real-valued functions u and v be respectively upper and
lower semicontinuous in Ω ⊂ Rn and denote
Mτ = sup
(x,y)∈Ω×Ω
(
u(x)− v(y)− τ
2
|x− y|2
)
for τ > 0. If (xτ , yτ ) ∈ Ω× Ω is such that
Mτ = u(xτ )− v(yτ )− τ
2
|xτ − yτ |2,
then
i) limτ→∞ τ |xτ − yτ |2 = 0;
ii) limτ→∞Mτ = u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) = supx∈Ω(u(x)− v(x)), whenever xτ → xˆ ∈ Ω as τ →∞.
Proof. Since τ |xτ − yτ |2 ≥ 0, Mτ is non-increasing as τ increases. According to this,
Mτ/2 ≥ u(xτ )− v(yτ )− τ
4
|xτ − yτ |2
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= u(xτ )− v(yτ )− τ
2
|xτ − yτ |2 + τ
4
|xτ − yτ |2
= Mτ +
τ
4
|xτ − yτ |2,
which is equivalent to say
4(Mτ/2 −Mτ ) ≥ τ |xτ − yτ |2. (6.29)
We use the fact that limτ→∞Mτ is finite, which holds since for all x, y ∈ Ω compact, u(x)−v(y) is
upper semicontinuous and τ/2 |x− y|2 is continuous (this is just the extension to semicontinuous
functions of the extreme value theorem). Hence, by taking the limit τ →∞ in (6.29) we can
conclude that limτ→∞ τ |xτ − yτ |2 = 0 since τ |xτ − yτ |2 ≥ 0 and limτ→∞ 4(Mτ/2 −Mτ ) = 0.
For the second result of the lemma, consider
u(xτ )− v(yτ )− τ
2
|xτ − yτ |2 = Mτ = sup
(x,y)∈Ω×Ω
(
u(x)− v(y)− τ
2
|x− y|2
)
≥ sup
x∈Ω
(u(x)− v(x)) . (6.30)
Because Ω is compact we can always find a sequence (xτ )τ and a point xˆ ∈ Ω such that
limτ→∞ xτ = xˆ ∈ Ω. Moreover, from the first result of the lemma we also have that limτ→∞ yτ =
xˆ. According to this,
u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) ≥ lim sup
τ→∞
(u(xτ )− v(yτ )) ≥ lim
τ→∞ (u(xτ )− v(yτ )) = limτ→∞Mτ , (6.31)
where in the leftmost inequality we used the upper semicontinuity of u − v in Ω, and the
rightmost equality follows from the first result of the lemma. Then, taking τ →∞ in (6.30) and
in combination with (6.31), one obtains
u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) ≥ lim
τ→∞Mτ ≥ sup
x∈Ω
(u(x)− v(x)) . (6.32)
But supx∈Ω (u(x)− v(x)) ≥ u(xˆ)− v(xˆ), so that all the inequalities in (6.32) become equalities,
which gives us the second result of the lemma.
We also include a theorem (see [16, Theorem 4.8] for details) involving the set-valued
functions J2,+Ω u(xˆ) and J
2,−
Ω v(xˆ), which are crucial when proving Theorem 6.3 due to the lack
of regularity of viscosity subsolutions and viscosity supersolutions, as mentioned above.
Theorem 6.12. Let u and v be real-valued functions respectively upper and lower semicontinuous
in Ω and (xτ , yτ ) ∈ Ω×Ω a local maximum point of the function u(x)− v(y)− τ/2 |x− y|2, for
τ > 0. Then there exist Xτ , Yτ ∈ Sn such that
(τ(xτ − yτ ), Xτ ) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xτ ); (τ(xτ − yτ ), Yτ ) ∈ J
2,−
Ω v(yτ )
and
− 3τ
(
I 0
0 I
)
≤
(
Xτ 0
0 −Yτ
)
≤ 3τ
(
I −I
−I I
)
. (6.33)
Remark 6.13. In particular, from the rightmost inequality in (6.33), we get〈(
Xτ 0
0 −Yτ
)(
ξ
ξ
)
,
(
ξ
ξ
)〉
≤ 3τ
〈(
I −I
−I I
)(
ξ
ξ
)
,
(
ξ
ξ
)〉
=⇒ 〈Xτ ξ, ξ〉 − 〈Yτ ξ, ξ〉 ≤ 0,
and since this holds for any ξ ∈ Rn we can conclude that Xτ ≤ Yτ .
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Arguing by contradiction, we suppose that supΩ(u− v) > 0. Since Ω is
compact and u and −v are upper semicontinuous by hypothesis, the supremum is attained (this
is just the extension to semicontinuous functions of the extreme value theorem). And because
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u ≤ v on ∂Ω, it follows that there is a point xˆ ∈ Ω such that u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) = maxΩ(u− v) > 0.
On the other hand, by Lemma 6.10, for every γ > 0 there exists a lower semicontinuous function
v˜ such that v˜ − v ≤ γ in Ω. As a result, u(xˆ)− v(xˆ) > γ ≥ v˜(xˆ)− v(xˆ) for γ small enough and
therefore u(xˆ) > v˜(xˆ).
This implies that there is a point x˜ ∈ Ω such that u(x˜)− v˜(x˜) = maxΩ(u− v˜) > 0 (recall
that −v˜ is upper semicontinuous by construction, as it is v). In fact x˜ ∈ Ω since by Lemma 6.10,
we can assume v˜ − v ≥ −γ on ∂Ω and therefore u(x˜)− v˜(x˜) > γ ≥ v(x)− v˜(x) ≥ u(x)− v˜(x)
for all x ∈ ∂Ω. For the sake of simplicity let us assume x˜ to be xˆ.
Consider then
Mτ = sup
(x,y)∈Ω×Ω
(
u(x)− v˜(y)− τ
2
|x− y|2
)
for τ > 0, which is finite since u(x)− v˜(y) is upper semicontinuous, τ/2 |x− y|2 is continuous
and Ω is compact. This also implies that the supremum is achieved in Ω × Ω. We denote
this maximum point by (xτ , yτ ), so that Mτ = u(xτ ) − v˜(yτ ) − τ/2 |xτ − yτ |2. In particular
Mτ ≥ u(xˆ)− v˜(xˆ), so that from Lemma 6.11 it follows that (xτ , yτ ) ∈ Ω× Ω for large τ . Then,
Theorem 6.12 implies that there exist Xτ , Yτ ∈ Sn such that
(τ(xτ − yτ ), Xτ ) ∈ J2,+Ω u(xτ ) and (τ(xτ − yτ ), Yτ ) ∈ J
2,−
Ω v˜(yτ ) and Xτ ≤ Yτ .
By Lemma 6.10, v˜ is a viscosity supersolution of equation (6.23) and a strict viscosity
supersolution of (6.1), in fact. This is equivalent to saying that
min
{|∇v˜(x)| − 1,−∆N∞v˜(x)} ≥ µ > 0
holds in the viscosity sense. According to this, in view of Lemma 6.9 and the following numerical
inequality
min{a, b} −min{a, c} ≤ max{0, b− c} for a, b, c ∈ R,
we arrive to the following contradiction,
0 < µ ≤ min
{
τ |xτ − yτ | − 1, −
〈
Yτ
xτ − yτ
|xτ − yτ | ,
xτ − yτ
|xτ − yτ |
〉}
−min
{
τ |xτ − yτ | − 1, −
〈
Xτ
xτ − yτ
|xτ − yτ | ,
xτ − yτ
|xτ − yτ |
〉}
≤ max
{
0, −
〈
(Yτ −Xτ ) xτ − yτ|xτ − yτ | ,
xτ − yτ
|xτ − yτ |
〉}
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Xτ ≤ Yτ .
Consider now the following maximum principle which, although it does not play any role in
the proof of Theorem 6.1, follows directly from Theorem 6.3 (the proof is inspired by [7, Section
5.B]).
Corollary 6.14 (Maximum Principle). Under the same assumptions of Theorem 6.3, it holds
sup
x∈Ω
(u(x)− v(x)) = sup
x∈∂Ω
(u(x)− v(x)).
Proof. Let K be a constant such that u−K ≤ v on ∂Ω. Since J2,+Ω (u−K)(x) = J2,+Ω u(x) and
G(x, u(x)−K, p,X) = G(x, u(x), p,X) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Ω, it follows from Lemma 6.9 that u−K
is a viscosity subsolution of equation (6.1). Moreover, since u is upper semicontinuous in Ω, so
it is u−K. At this point, by Theorem 6.3 we have that u−K ≤ v in Ω, i.e., u− v ≤ K in Ω.
The result then follows by taking K = sup∂Ω(u− v), which is finite since ∂Ω is compact and u
and −v are upper semicontinuous by hypothesis (this is just the extension to semicontinuous
functions of the extreme value theorem).
Appendix A
Second-order elliptic operators
The following definitions are taken from [9, Chapter 6], where a deep look into second-order
elliptic equations is considered. Let G denote a second-order partial differential operator in
either the so called divergence form,
Gu = −
n∑
i,j=1
∂
∂xj
(
ai,j(x)
∂u
∂xi
)
+
n∑
i=1
bi(x)
∂u
∂xi
+ c(x)u, (A.1)
or in non-divergence form,
Gu = −
n∑
i,j=1
ai,j(x)
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
+
n∑
i=1
bi(x)
∂u
∂xi
+ c(x)u, (A.2)
for a given function u = u(x) : Ω → R and real coefficient functions ai,j(x), bi(x), c(x) for
i, j = 1, . . . , n, defined in Ω. Consider also the symmetry condition ai,j(x) = aj,i(x) for all
i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Remark A.1. Both forms are equivalent provided the coefficients ai,j(x) (i, j = 1, . . . , n) are
differentiable and u is C2. Then, an operator G written in divergence form can be rewritten into
non-divergence structure and vice versa. Indeed the divergence form (A.1), under the required
regularity assumptions, becomes
Gu = −
n∑
i,j=1
ai,j(x)
∂2u
∂xj∂xi
+
n∑
i=1
b˜i(x)
∂u
∂xi
+ c(x)u
for b˜i(x) = bi(x) −
∑n
j=1
∂
∂xj
ai,j(x) (i = 1, . . . , n), which is non-divergence form. In other
words, we can go from (A.1) to (A.2) and vice versa whenever
∂
∂xj
(
ai,j(x)
∂u
∂xi
)
= ai,j(x)
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
+
∂u
∂xi
∂
∂xj
ai,j(x)
holds for all i, j = 1 . . . , n. The divergence form is most natural for energy methods, based upon
integration by parts, and the non-divergence form is most appropriate for maximum principle
techniques. Observe that, in the case of solutions that might not be regular enough for (A.1) and
(A.2) to hold in the classical sense, (A.1) and (A.2) are no longer equivalent.
Definition A.2 (Elliptic operator). The second-order partial differential operator G is said to
be elliptic if there exists a constant λ > 0 such that
n∑
i,j=1
ai,j(x) ξi ξj ≥ λ |ξ|2
for almost every x ∈ Ω and all ξ ∈ Rn.
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